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
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AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE MODERN WORLD

LONDON
HUMPHREY MILFORD : OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
IN THE
MODERN WORLD

BY ARTHUR BULLARD
WITH A FOREWORD BY
ROLAND S. MORRIS

71153

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS
PHILADELPHIA: 1928

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FOREWORD

I welcome this opportunity to commend these lectures to all those who are interested in America's attitude towards modern international problems. I cannot think of anyone who is better equipped to discuss this subject than Mr. Bullard. He brings to it a wide experience and a disinterested and objective point of view. He belongs to that adventurous group of progressive young men who in the opening days of this century gave themselves to the study of social conditions and to the interpretation of those conditions to their own generation. These interests led Mr. Bullard beyond the confines of the United States after he had spent many years in social service work, first as a member of the University Settlement in New York and later as probation officer, representing the Prison Association of New York. He early realized that our own social problems had their origin not in local but in world conditions, and this led him to spend many years of travel and study in northern Africa, the Near East, the Balkans, and Central Europe. The results of these years of study and observation can be found in his volumes on *Panama, The Barbary Coast, The Diplomacy of the Great War* and a large number of special articles dealing with different phases of our international relations.

It was this experience and study which made Mr. Bullard so valuable during the early years of the Great War, when through the pages of *The Outlook* he interpreted the startling developments to his own people. His own attitude towards our duty during that period found expression in his popular and effective volume entitled *Mobilizing America*. When our country entered the war Mr. Bullard's knowledge was of great value to the Government and his services were immediately used in several important missions. I met him first in Siberia, where he had established a publicity bureau to explain the attitude of our Government to the war-weary Russian people. His whole approach to the bewildering problem of Russia has been since the early days of the Revolution balanced, open-minded and sane. There is no better picture of Revolutionary Russia in the early stages of the Bolshevik movement than his volume entitled *The Russian Pendulum*. In 1925 Mr. Bullard was the representative to the League of Nations' Non-Partisan Association at Geneva, having previously served as secretary to the president of the Memel Commission of the League of Nations. In 1926 he was appointed a member of the Information Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations and in 1927 he was attached to the American Delegation to the International Economic Conference in Geneva, and later attended as adviser the Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce at Stockholm.

ROLAND S. MORRIS

September, 1928

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AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
IN THE MODERN WORLD

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I

AMERICA AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY

THE theme which the Jayne Memorial Committee has chosen for me has to do with the modern world, and my subject deals with the new machinery of international relations. May I, however, first call your attention to something very old? The University of Pennsylvania is famous for its work in archæology. Among the treasures in its Museum is a brick tablet which was dug up in the excavations at Nippur. It is a broken fragment, but your savants have deciphered enough of the cuneiform inscription to tell us that it was dated about 1440 B. C. and it has to do with some prisoners of war. There is a message to the King: "When are ye finally going to decide their affairs, seeing that we are holding the young ones as prisoners?" And the King replies, "Send . . . the young slaves . . . send . . . that they set them free."

In the British Museum in London there are some similar clay records, which were discovered in Egypt at Tel el-Amarna. One of them, from Rib-Adda, the

ruler of Byblos, to the Pharaoh, illustrates my point even better.

"Thus said Rib-Adda to the Lord and King of the World, the Great King, the King of the Universe: 'May the Lady of Byblos give strength to the King, my Lord!' Seven times and seven times do I prostrate myself before the feet of my Lord and my Sun."

Rib-Adda goes on to report that dangers threaten the City of Byblos, because the King of Egypt takes no thought for its safety. The peoples of the cities in the mountains and on the frontier have gone over to the enemy, Abd-Ashirta. He has sent word to the rebels: "Gather yourselves together and let us go up against Byblos and let us occupy the countries through which we pass and appoint our own governors over them." Rib-Adda is afraid that no one will deliver him out of the hands of the King's enemies, for, shut up in the city of Byblos, he is like a bird in a cage.

Dated approximately 1500 to 2000 years before Christ, these are among our oldest records of human writing. They are diplomatic notes. Diplomacy is no new thing.

These ancient dispatches must have been many weary weeks in transit, but we find in them many characteristics, which, persisting to our day, mark the manifold diplomatic correspondence, between the Foreign Offices of the world, that at this very moment stream through the ether, with the speed of light. Much of the difference between the diplomacy of our day and that of the Pharaohs is the result of

the scientists' contribution to the ease and speed of communications. The caravans which delivered these ancient notes have been rendered as obsolete as the language in which they were written, by the Wright Brothers and Lindbergh. The fast runner who brought the news from Marathon has been outstripped by wire and wireless.

In spite of increased speed, however, the substance has changed very little. These ancient documents have to do with war. In its origins, diplomacy dealt with little else. In the olden days—until a very recent date in the long history of civilization—nations rarely met except on the field of battle. International intercourse was limited to war, to tribute, and to alliances for the conduct of war. Not till after the French Revolution, not till Napoleon and the Russian Tsar began to bid against each other for the support of public opinion, do we find much trace of the idea that the object of diplomacy is the preservation of peace.

The violent beginnings of the relations between nations is clearly shown by the present state of International Law. There has never been a Parliament of Man, which could legislate for all the world, so the Law of Nations—what there is of it—has developed like the Common Law of England from customs and precedents. As the nations have fought among themselves from time immemorial, there has grown up a considerable and venerable tradition about the etiquette of fighting, especially about the formalities of declaring war, but there is considerably less International Law dealing with "friendly

relations." The idea is too new to have developed a tradition.

These clay records from the dawn of history remind us, just as the fossil remains of paleolithic man recall our human origins, that our modern machinery of international relations has evolved through the millenniums out of—up from—a dark and violent beginning. History does not suggest that the condition which we call "Peace" is natural or normal. It is the fine flower of civilization—a state of tension, from which it is all too easy to relax.

Not only is much of the subject-matter of diplomacy the same today that it was forty centuries ago, many of the old attitudes persist. The scholars who decipher these old cuneiform documents must be troubled—so, at least, it seems to a layman—to determine whether they are correspondence between the kings or prayers to the King of Kings. In these records of early civilizations there is a marked similarity between the phrases of magic charms and those of state papers. An old proverb of the Russian peasants said: "God is far above, the Tsar far away." The distance which separated the common man from the Pharaoh was so great that it seemed hardly less infinite than the remoteness of Deity. So the style of these brick missives is almost theological. And even to our own day diplomacy has retained an esoteric style. Diplomats still drape themselves in mysterious aloofness and, as though engaged in the ritual of some strange and awful god, screen their activities from the vulgar gaze.

Modern diplomacy bears the marks of the past not

only in its tendency to rattle the sabre and in its love of mystery, but even in its language. It loves old terms.

A frequent phrase on the lips of diplomatists is the maintenance of the *Status Quo*. They employ a dead language to express an idea which is the antithesis of life. It would be laughed out of court, if phrased in a common tongue. *Status Quo!* The sonorous Latin has an impressive sound. Translated into plain English, the idea of "holding things as they are" is absurd to anyone who has heard of Mr. Darwin. Despite the overwhelming evidence that life is dynamic, that change and growth is the law of all but death, that the very essence of the world in which we live is flux, the diplomats love this obsolete phrase and use it glibly.

When war broke out in the Balkans, Sir Edward Grey, then the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, called a conference of ambassadors in London. They solemnly announced that the Great Powers would not tolerate any alteration in the *Status Quo*. They reiterated this magic formula month after month—*"Status Quo"*—*"Status Quo"*—as though it were a phrase to conjure with, while all the world watched the old *status* crumbling, the Empire of the Sultan dissolving, the established balance of power tottering, the map of Southeastern Europe being torn to shreds.

It was at this time that a minister in Sofia told King Ferdinand of Bulgaria that the Great Powers would not permit any change in the *"Status Quo." "Les grandes puissances,"* the king replied, *"dites, plutôt,*

les impuissances." Not all the Great Powers combined can compel the sun and stars to stand still.

When it was all over and the Treaty of Bucharest had drawn the new frontiers of the Balkans, the Conference of Ambassadors at London adjourned, with one last solemn manifesto to the effect that the Great Powers would not tolerate any further change in the *Status Quo*. It was not many months before the frontiers of Europe had been replaced by front-line trenches.

This extreme conservatism, this clinging to old and outworn phrases, is not confined to the diplomats of "the effete monarchies of Europe." This up-to-date republic of ours has not yet taken cognizance of the fact that Queen Victoria moved her court—bag and baggage—to Buckingham Palace. We still accredit our ambassadors to "the Court of St. James," which the British sovereigns deserted half a century ago.

These old phrases, however, even if they have lost all present meaning, are worth study because of their historical associations. There is one of them to which I invite your especial attention.

Some years ago a diplomat, who was a stranger to me, presented his card.

"I must apologize," he said, "for my formal and formidable title." On his card were the words: "Envoy Extraordinary." It was so familiar a phrase in Washington that I had never considered its meaning. "I am a very ordinary man," he said, "and my business is not at all extraordinary."

This old phrase has survived in the usage of diplomacy, just as certain bones at the base of the spine

have persisted in the human body. There is nothing extraordinary in the gentlemen who form the diplomatic corps at Washington and as for their business, most of them welcome a game of golf or a trip to New York as relief from the boredom of their ordinary routine. And yet what visions of olden days this obsolete title evokes! Time was when the arrival of an embassy from a foreign court was a great and extraordinary event. It used to be an adventure to be named envoy to some distant land. In the volumes published by the Hakluyt Society, none are more thrilling than those that give the chronicle of embassies sent in search of Prester John or to buy the support of Genghis Khan.

Carlyle, in one of his pungent phrases, gives a vivid picture of the extraordinary effect created by an ancient embassy. He describes the arrival at the English Court of envoys from the East, "dripping pearls and vermin."

Two things have happened since those days when envoys were extraordinary. First the glamor of unfamiliar climes has faded. The sons of Mr. Cook and their imitators have made travel comfortable and commonplace. Our friends return from trips to the far corners of the earth laden with gilt instead of gold, with celluloid beads in place of jade. Mere distance has lost its extraordinary sheen.

The disappearance of "No Man's Land," of the vast empty and mysterious stretches which formerly separated the nations, has meant a great increase in intercourse. When nations become neighbors their interests touch, overlap and collide. Such contact ne-

cessitates frequent negotiations, too frequent to be conducted by rare and occasional missions.

Even more important than the shrinkage of the earth, due to easier communications, has been the growth of commerce. Students of prehistory have traced the trade routes of the Stone Age by noting on maps every find of neolithic amber ornaments. They have shown that business over-stepped frontiers, ignored distance and the difficulties of language, long before any man had learned to write his name. A graphic chart of the development of world trade, from those days of primitive barter, when bits of amber passed from hand to hand, from trader to trader, from Danzig to Delphos, would show a dizzying upslant. Commerce has caught up with, and has surpassed, war as the principal concern of diplomacy. The profits of trade prove more alluring than the spoils of war. And, while even the most belligerent of kings could fight only intermittently, business is continuous.

So with the growth of modern means of communication, countries which had formerly been remote became contiguous, and the intercourse which had at first been solely hostile and therefore occasional, gradually became, if not friendly, continuous. The affairs of nations could no longer be carried on by extraordinary embassies. Envoys, originally sent to arrange some specific matter, expecting to return when it was finished, found more and more business to transact, stayed longer and longer. Before one negotiation ended, a new one started. "Residence" grew from month to year and to year after year. Be-

ing an ambassador changed from an adventure to a steady job.

There is no definite date for this transformation of extraordinary missions to permanent legations; the change came gradually, the circumstances of the evolution differing with each country. During our Revolution, we had Franklin in Paris and a score of other envoys in Europe on specific, extraordinary missions. Gradually our Foreign Service has evolved towards regularity and permanence. At last Congress is appropriating funds to build not only residences for our representatives abroad, but also office buildings for their permanent staffs.

This obvious evolution has had no effect on terminology; we still call our regular representatives "Envoys Extraordinary." This mummy of a phrase, as behind the times as the Pharaoh, is worth holding in mind, for it illumines an even more important evolution in the machinery of diplomacy.

In the earliest dawn of history, it became evident that diplomacy is not always a dialogue. Even in the days of which Homer sang, international relations had become multilateral. No two-party negotiations could have brought Helen back from Troy. It would have been difficult for Menelaos to have organized the Greek Coalition by an exchange of notes, impossible to have held it together through that long siege by diplomatic correspondence. Again and again, we read in the Iliad how, in one crisis after another, the kings met in conference.

When history emerges from poetic legend, we find the Confederation of the Greek States regularly or-

ganized, transacting their business through the Amphictyonic Council. The orations of Demosthenes recount the dramatic struggle between these two methods of diplomacy. Philip of Macedonia, plotting the subjugation of all Greece, marching steadily towards his goal, sought to keep Athens and Sparta and Thebes, Thrace and the Isles at loggerheads by dealing with each separately, by diplomatic notes and special embassies. Demosthenes strove earnestly, if vainly, to bring all these city states into effective co-operation against Philip by means of a conference.

War being the principal preoccupation of early diplomacy, it is natural that the conference method first appears as a means of organizing or directing military alliances. But the usefulness of this method soon proved itself in other fields.

A large element in the amazing rise and sudden spread of Islam was the annual conference of the followers of the Prophet at Mecca. Mohammed ordained the pilgrimage as a religious rite, but the politically-minded as well as the pious took the long trail from Andalusia and Algiers, from the Crimea and the Caspian, from Turkestan and Isphahan. After they had thrown the ritualistic stones at the Devil and had kissed the Kaaba, they sat down to discuss the state of the nation. The Hadj kept alive a vital unity in Islam through many centuries. It represents all the unity there is today in the Mohammedan world.

As western civilization began again to unify, after the fall of Rome and the anarchic chaos of the Dark Ages, the conference method developed with rapid-

ity. The interests of the nations, which were taking shape, crossed and recrossed. Many of the most important problems that faced the statesmen of the Awakening were more than two-party affairs, they were general, multilateral. At first the international conferences of Europe were in fact, in the same sense as the early embassies, "extraordinary." They were so rare and so impressive that they could be used as dating points. The Congress of Westphalia marked the end of one era, the beginning of another. The Congress of Vienna "liquidated" the Napoleonic adventure, organized the Modern Europe, which we used to study before the Great War.

The last century saw a marked increase in the number of international conferences and an even more significant change in their subject matter. Of major political importance were the Congress of Paris in 1856, after the Crimean War; the Congress of Berlin in 1879, which was called to hold Russia in check, after her victory over Turkey; the Hague Conferences; the Conference of London in 1908 on the Laws of Naval Warfare. In all these conferences the old preoccupation of diplomacy was to the fore, their purpose was to end or prevent war.

Simultaneously something quite new was developing in the same field. At Washington and at St. Petersburg there were international conferences on the buoyage and lightage of harbors. There were conferences at Shanghai and the Hague on opium, one in Paris on the traffic in women. Again, the nations met in conference in Brussels (1901) to prevent unfair competition in the new beet sugar industry. In-

ternational conferences drew up treaties on copyright, trade marks, and cable rates. Perhaps the most interesting of all these non-political conferences, of all these diplomatic gatherings which had nothing to do with war, was the one at Berne in 1874 that created the Universal Postal Union.

There was one point in common in these pre-War conferences, whether they dealt with destructive war or creative peace. They were convoked for a definite purpose, to do a specific job. They were occasional, *ad hoc,* discontinuous. But the amount of international business, which, needing multilateral agreement, called for such conferences, was growing apace —business which covered all the gamut from peace to postage. Many of these conferences dealt with problems which could not be solved once for all, matters calling for frequent reconsideration, continuous revision. In a few cases, provision was made for periodic reconvening. The Universal Postal Union went farther and established a permanent administrative secretariat at Berne. But most of these conferences, in spite of the obvious need for continuation work, adjourned *sine die.* They were occasional, discontinuous, "extraordinary."

The Great War gave a tremendous stimulus to the conference method. We are more familiar with events on our side, but the same development was notable in the opposing coalition. At first the Allied generals met infrequently. Joffre had few face-to-face talks with Sir John French; the Chiefs of State met even less often.

I chanced to be in Paris when the Allied Finance

Ministers met for the first time. I am tempted into a parenthesis to recount a famous witticism of that meeting. Some English and American journalists interviewed M. Bark, the Russian Minister of Finance.

"You want to know what we have been doing today," he said; "of course I can't go into the details, but I will tell you that we have been engaged in a most un-Anglo-Saxon enterprise. I was taught as a boy that the corner stone of your political philosophy was 'No Taxation without Representation.' Am I right? Well, today we have been arranging to tax people who have given us no mandate to represent them—generations yet unborn!"

These Ministers of Finance discussed the economic problems of the Allies for a few days and then, stating in a communique that they had accomplished more at this meeting than in months of correspondence, disbanded without fixing a date for a new meeting. But the need of more serious, more continuous organization made itself felt long before the Armistice. A score of permanent organizations, ranging from the Supreme Council to the Inter-Allied Shipping Board in London, grew up to meet a definite need. "Permanent Contact" became a fashionable phrase. Regular meetings were arranged for the officials of the different governments, charged with everything from munitions production to passport control.

We, during the organization of our national life for the conduct of the war, watched at home what had taken place in Europe. We could not administer transportation, war trade, the fuel supply or priori-

ties in raw materials, by bureaucratic correspondence between officials. The Food Administration could not have done its work, if it had relied on occasional conferences of experts. Permanent contact and continuous consultation, which required regular organization, was obviously necessary.

This need of permanent organization, experience in how it worked, was fresh in the minds of the men who, during the Peace Conference, drew up the Covenant of the League of Nations. That document marks the transition from the *ad hoc,* discontinuous conference extraordinary to permanently organized conference machinery—work-a-day and ordinary.

The evolution of two-party diplomacy, the gradual change in status from occasional, special missions to permanent legations, which we can trace in history, is taking place under our eyes, in the rapidly developing and more complex area of multilateral diplomacy. As the nations are being crowded closer and closer together, especially as trade and finance burst their way across frontiers, the number of negotiations which concern only two nations, which can be conducted by dialogue, is decreasing in relation to those that touch the interests of many governments at once. The volume and variety of multilateral work has grown to such an extent that there is hardly a day in the year when some international conference is not in session. This is not a phenomenon confined to Europe; the American Government has participated in more international conferences since the war than in all its previous history.

It is cumbersome, inefficient, wasteful of time and

effort to create a new organization every time a conference is needed. The League of Nations—the experiment in the organization of a permanent conference system, which is being carried on at Geneva—is an attempt to meet a need that is real and increasingly insistent.

* * *

In this chapter we are discussing the "form," not the "content" of diplomacy. I have sought to trace the development of the "machinery" of international relations, and machinery is a-moral.

The invention of the typewriter did not make it easier to write the truth nor did it increase the output of good poetry. It was a labor-saving device, without ethical code or sense of beauty. But we, of practical-minded America, are surprised if we encounter anyone who refuses to use a typewriter because it makes it easier to record falsehood, because the incompetent rhymester can pound out more bad sonnets on it. I remember the shock which it caused me, when I was in the Department of State, to find that one of the ambassadors in Washington still regarded the typewriter as undignified, insisted on writing his diplomatic notes with a quill pen and made his secretaries sit up all night copying them by hand.

Although I believe that the League of Nations is more than a mere mechanism, although I find in it more attractive humanity than in a typewriter, I beg you to consider it only as a machine—not as a means of better accomplishment, but as a better means of accomplishment. The organization built on the Covenant, just like the government erected on our

Constitution, will of course live or die, flourish or languish, according to the capacity and integrity of those who are chosen to operate it. But for the moment let us ignore that aspect of the problem and consider the institution at Geneva as a tool.

There are a number of points—"talking-points," as an automobile salesman would say—in which this new mechanism at Geneva is as much superior to former methods as the new Ford is to the pre-War model.

I

First of all there is a great gain in mere permanence. This is perhaps most obvious in the most mechanical aspect of the League, in its trained staff of stenographers, translators, editors. Practice in the work of conferences, which follow each other at Geneva with hardly an intermission, has perfected their methods. Mimeographed reports of a morning's session are available in English and French in the afternoon. The "verbatims" of an evening debate are served for breakfast. This may seem a small detail, but it is of real importance, and such service is never attained in a conference organized on the old-fashioned, *ad hoc* method.

In 1923 there was a Conference of American Republics in Santiago de Chile—like the recent one at Havana. Because of faulty secretarial organization, some of the minutes—notably those on the discussion of disarmament—are not yet published. For the

Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments at Washington, Congress made what seemed liberal appropriations, but there was no provision for follow-up work. The special staff, which had been recruited hurriedly and with difficulty, had to be disbanded as soon as the Conference adjourned, and the work of translating, editing and publishing the records was unloaded on the already overworked regular staff of the Department of State. The French Government did not get the documents in their own language for months and months. In fact, our newspapers began to criticize them for slowness in ratifying the treaties before the texts were available in Paris.

It is not without interest for us to note that the Chief of the Internal Services of the League, who is responsible for the development of this efficient secretarial machine, is an American, Mr. Howard Huston. The excellence of this aspect of the work of the League has had no more striking endorsement than the fact that our Government asked the League for the loan of a secretarial staff, for the Three Power Naval Conference of last summer.

Such improvements in technique, however, are, even if striking, less important than the preparation and continuation work which a permanent organization permits. The problem of double taxation, which has become vexing in the extreme, furnishes a good example. Almost all whose business requires them to live in a foreign country, have to pay taxes on the same income, at home and abroad. Numerous cases are on record, where the same source of wealth is

taxed by more than two governments. Mr. Hoover commented on this situation in a report of the Department of Commerce. It is a handicap on all Americans who would push our trade abroad. The United States Chamber of Commerce became excited about it and took it up with the International Chamber. As it was obviously a governmental matter, they passed it up to Geneva. The League first called in for expert advice a group of academic economists—Professor Seligman of Columbia was one of them. They studied the problem from the viewpoint of pure theory. Then a small committee of government tax officials was summoned, men who had to struggle with the problem in practice, to go over the report of the theorists. Their recommendations were submitted in turn to a larger group and the result was drawn up in the form of a "draft treaty," which was sent to all the governments for criticism and suggestions. In the light of these replies a new text has been prepared, representing a careful balance between what is theoretically desirable and what is practically possible. A diplomatic conference is to meet in the near future to give it official consideration and—thanks to careful preparation—there is fair prospect that the evil will be considerably reduced, an evil which was first called to my attention by a report of our Department of Commerce.

An even better illustration of this advantage of a permanent organization is furnished by the great Economic Conference of last May. The preparation work, which lasted over a year, was unique. At its first meeting, the committee of experts which had

been called to prepare for the Conference posed this question: "If we were delegates to a World Economic Conference, what should we want to know?"

Few people who have not had their attention called to the subject realize the immense volume of economic statistics that is being published these days, or the appalling lack of co-ordination in the output. Every government in the world regularly publishes whole books of figures about export and import, industry and unemployment, the cost of living, dealings on the stock exchange. Every government creates special fact-finding commissions on housing conditions and the agricultural situation. The professors of economics in every university are publishing the results of their special studies. The output is tremendous and there is no general plan, no common terminology, the index figures of one country are too often not comparable with those of other countries. Not even a specialist in statistics can comprehend and use it all. To the ordinary business man or government official it is utterly bewildering—so much so that everybody regards statistics with suspicion.

The story is told of an Irishman who, after many years' wandering, returned to Milwaukee and encountered an old friend; after exchanging more general news, they got down to personal matters.

"How many children have you got now?" the wanderer asked.

"Four," his friend said.

"But you had four when I went away. What's the matter?"

"Well, it's this way," the stay-at-home friend re-

plied, "the wife read in the paper that every fifth child born in Milwaukee was a German and we didn't want any German children."

But sounder conclusions than that can be drawn from statistics, by people who understand them. The Preparatory Committee set itself the task of untangling from this welter of unco-ordinated data information about the significant aspects of the present economic situation. The result was a very remarkable set of documents, which will be of permanent value. A first series consisted of National Memoranda. Each country was asked to prepare, on a common plan, a statement of its economic position and its principal problems. A second series consisted of reports from the great key industries, coal, shipping, steel, textile, etc. Their trade associations prepared accounts of what had happened to them during and since the war. There was a third group of monographs on more general subjects; population, national banks, the balance of world trade, and an especially interesting report from the International Chamber of Commerce on "Trade Barriers." Never before had so complete a picture of the economic situation of the world on a given date been prepared.

To the Economic Conference, which met in May, 1927, came important delegations from all the world. Our Government sent an impressive group: Mr. Harry Robinson, who had been a member of the Dawes Committee; Mr. Norman H. Davis, who had been Financial Adviser to the American Delegation at the Peace Conference, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Under-Secretary of State; Mr. Julius

Klein, Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in the Department of Commerce; Dr. Alonzo Taylor, an expert in food problems; and Mr. O'Leary, the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce. The other countries sent equally weighty delegations — men altogether too busy to have dug out for themselves the facts that had been gathered for them by the Preparatory Committee. Very largely because the material was presented to them in intelligible, co-ordinated, usable form—because of this careful preparation—the Conference was able to reach unanimous agreement on a number of recommendations.

In explaining the work of the Economic Conference, in a speech before the Congress of the International Chambers of Commerce, which met at Stockholm a few months later—and, by the way, unanimously joined in hearty endorsement of these recommendations—Sir Arthur Salter, Chief of the Economic and Financial Section of the League, summed up the recommendations in regard to trade barriers in these words:

"This then is the unanimous advice of what is perhaps the most authoritative body of experts that has ever met to discuss economic policies. It is, as you will see, the proclamation of a policy, not indeed of 'free trade,' on which opinion must have been divided, but of 'freer trade,' on which all were agreed.

"A system which had grown up piecemeal was surveyed as a whole. The very persons who in their respective countries, surrounded by high and increasing

tariffs, advocated an increase in their own, realized that for the world as a whole this was a disastrous policy. What had looked like individual wisdom was seen to be collective insanity. They met at Geneva and drew up instead a decalogue of collective wisdom."

And in adjourning, the Economic Conference turned over the follow-up work to the already existing permanent organization of the League. In the furtherance of these recommendations, one diplomatic conference has already been held on the abolition of import and export prohibition. Our Government was officially represented at this conference and, after a long delay, has signed the treaty with certain reservations. Perhaps the delay and the reservations were due to the embarrassment which our Government always feels when faced with the word "prohibition."

Other conferences are being prepared. There is a permanent organization steadily pressing for the translation of the recommendations of this conference into Acts of Governments. Day after day, the governments are being reminded of, are being urged to act upon, this "decalogue of collective wisdom" drawn up by "the most authoritative body of experts that ever met to discuss economic policies."

Although they are said to be odious it is well to make a comparison between this Economic Conference and the recent Conference of American Republics. In the long list of subjects to be considered at Havana, there were a number of economic items similar to those on the agenda at Geneva, but there had not been anything like so careful preparatory

study of them. And I think that that eminent Philadelphian, Dr. Leo Rowe, must regret that the Pan American Union, of which he is the Director General, has not the same facilities for following up the work done at Havana as those that are available at Geneva.

In all the field of diplomacy, our Government has the most definite and concrete interest in the Pan American area. Here we can expect the most precise and carefully formulated policies. But for the carrying out of these policies, it confines itself to old-fashioned machinery—the pre-War model.

Another noteworthy advantage in a permanent international organization like that at Geneva is the increased facility in calling conferences. Our Government has recently had a striking experience in the disadvantages of the old method. The Washington Conference dealt not only with naval problems, but also with Far Eastern questions. It was agreed that there should be two special conferences on Chinese matters. It was provided that a special conference to study tariff and taxation revision should "meet in China within three months after the coming in force of the present treaty," and that another Commission of Extra-territoriality should be "constituted within three months after the adjournment of the Conference."

If this matter had been handled through an organization like the League of Nations, these conferences would have been held on schedule, or all the world would have known who was responsible for the delay. But our Government, although deeply inter-

ested in the success of its program, did not have this means of action at its disposal. It had to rely on the old-fashioned method of diplomacy—the formal exchange of secret diplomatic notes. Due to bad judgment or to bad will, some of the governments were willing to have these conferences postponed to the Greek Kalends. France, for instance, had a controversy with the Chinese on quite another matter and refused to proceed with these steps—which the Chinese wanted—until they conceded the French point in the other negotiations. The correspondence on the subject of these conferences dragged. No one, except those on the innest of the inside, knew who was responsible for the delay. Months and months, with China rapidly crumbling into chaos, were lost. No governments would have dared to make a public statement that they were sabotaging the agreements made at Washington. Yet, if the project had been run through the mill at Geneva, all the governments would have had to facilitate the carrying out of these agreements or publicly to justify their opposition. The machinery which our Government used, secret diplomatic correspondence, was peculiarly adapted for the defeat of its own purpose. It reminds one of the dear old ambassador in Washington, laboriously penning his communication to the Department of State, because he distrusted the typewriter!

II

The increased facility in the conduct of international relations, which has come from the frequent

personal meetings of statesmen at a regularly established center, is an even more striking advantage of modern diplomacy.

Before the outbreak of the Great War, Sir Edward Grey, the man in charge of the British Foreign Office, had crossed the Channel to the Continent of Europe only once. During those critical days of July, 1914, when the peace of the world was in the balance, he did not know personally a single one of the Foreign Ministers with whom he had to deal. Sir Austen Chamberlain, who now presides at Downing Street, meets his colleagues four times a year at the Council of the League. In Geneva he meets, not only the "Big Wigs" like Briand and Stresemann, but the leading public men of all the member states, from Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. Every American school of business administration teaches the importance of personal touch between the managers of the different plants of an industrial enterprise. Chamberlain's acquaintance with the men who operate the machinery of international relations is immensely greater than that of his eminent predecessor.

The testimony of Herr Stresemann is worth consideration. He has repeatedly said that he was convinced that the Great War could have been prevented if the Foreign Ministers of Europe had been in as close and constant contact in 1914 as they are today. Stresemann has pressed the same point in another way. The relations between Germany and Poland are bad. The loss of territory to the Poles rankles more deeply in the German mind than the

loss of Alsace-Lorraine. In the days before Germany entered the League, it was diplomatically impossible for the German and Polish Ministers of Foreign Affairs to meet. If Herr Stresemann had gone to Warsaw, his nationalistic opponents at home would have howled that it was a new surrender. If the morning papers had announced that the Polish Minister was going to Berlin, his Government would have been overthrown before noon. They now meet every three months at Geneva. Without either one of them appearing to knuckle under, they have frequent opportunity quietly to discuss their difficulties. While nobody could describe the relations between the two countries as "good," they certainly are much improved.

It is a great thing that the Foreign Ministers should know each other by sight, but personal contact at Geneva means much more than that. Actual experience in working together breeds a habit of cooperation. Diplomatic intercourse in the old days was confined almost exclusively to matters in which the parties to the negotiations had a "direct interest," and in diplomatic jargon "direct interests" means "conflicting interests." Four times a year the Council of the League meets to discuss an agenda of forty or fifty items, few of which are of "direct interest" to all the states on the Council. As I have said, Poland and Germany have a number of definitely conflicting interests, but they do not find them involved when they are working together on the Greek Refugee Settlement. Paris and Berlin do not find themselves in opposing camps, when discussing public

health education in Latin America. And the South American Republics, with plenty of quarrels at home, are not directly interested in, and therefore not in conflict over, Hungarian Minorities in Rumania. East and West meet in amity, Canada and Japan can get together—get used to working together—trying to preserve peace in the Balkans.

The mutual understanding that results from co-operating on projects of world, rather than national interest, has created what is called "the Geneva Atmosphere." There is nothing mystic nor magical about it. The habit of seeking together the best solution of some problem where there is no collision of interest creates a frame of mind which proves of great value when it is necessary to meet, with give-and-take concessions, some real conflict. The fact that France and Italy have worked loyally together to prevent Poland and Lithuania, Bulgaria and Greece, from fighting over their frontier disputes makes it very much less probable that any "incident" on the Franco-Italian border will lead to war.

For the last few months the world has been treated to a most amazing exhibition of shadow-boxing between Mr. Kellogg and M. Briand. There is not the slightest reason to believe that there is any insincerity on the part of either government in its expressed desire to put the relations of the countries on a firm and friendly basis which will make war between them not only outlawed, but out-sensed. The notes they exchanged bedeviled the issue. Mr. Kellogg wrote that, in spite of the well-known friendship of the two sister republics, he was not prepared to

give up the Constitution. M. Briand replied that, although the fundamental interests of the two countries are identical, he cannot violate the existing treaties of his country. Some of the Administration newspapers say that they will drown Briand in the Lake of Geneva before they'll let any foreigners cram the League of Nations down our throats.

If it were not pathetic, it would be ludicrous. Can anyone seriously believe that either M. Briand or Mr. Kellogg is trying to put over what the other says he cannot permit? Can anyone believe that two gentlemen of undoubted good will, who have grown old in political life, could have started such a tangle of misunderstanding if they were acquainted with each other, if they had had a chance to talk it over intimately before they began shooting notes at each other? M. Briand would not get himself into any such game of crossword purposes with Herr Stresemann. They would have threshed the matter out in private conversation, made sure there was a basis of agreement, before they risked a public misunderstanding.

But M. Briand unfortunately does not speak English.

When he came to our country for the Washington Conference, he was kept waiting in his hotel room, while Mr. Hughes ironed out the 5-5-3 ratio with the British and Japanese. Briand did not get an opportunity to become well acquainted with us. And as for Mr. Kellogg, before this amazing correspondence started, he had received very few communications signed by Briand, except some horse-trading

ones, prepared by the economic advisers of the Quai d'Orsay, on tariff.

Modern diplomacy calls for personal contact, and if we prefer to carry on our international relations by the old-fashioned machinery of formal correspondence, we are of course free to, but we are likely to be outdistanced by those who are progressive enough to use post-War models. All the world rejoices that there has been some concrete result from this Briand-Kellogg correspondence. But Mr. Kellogg's success has been in getting his multilateral treaty signed and ratified, in spite of, not because of his antiquated methods.

III

Another thing which differentiates the work at Geneva from the pre-War conference is the presence of the third party—the disinterested. In the old-fashioned, *ad hoc* conferences, called for some special purpose, only those nations were invited which were directly interested. In the typical League conference, those directly interested are in the minority and must argue their case before the third party, whose only concern is the preservation of peace.

The Anglo-Turkish dispute over Mosul—the frontier of Iraq—furnished an illustration of how this new third-party mechanism works. In the old days the British Government would have decided what frontier it thought just—or at least what frontier it felt itself strong enough to defend. London

would have notified the other powers of its decision and they would have shrugged their shoulders. It was not their affair. If John Bull was getting himself into trouble, it was his worry. But, since the League has been organized, such indifference is impossible. Article X of the Covenant makes frontiers a matter of common concern.

It is extremely doubtful whether England and Turkey could have reached an agreement, if they had been left alone together. The temptation to argue with airplanes and machine guns would have been too great. But such arguments are "out of order" in the Glass Room, where the Council of the League holds its sessions. And so, again and again, the two parties argued their case before the third party—great powers like France and Italy; small powers like Sweden, Belgium, and Uruguay. The Council sent out a commission composed of citizens of three small, disinterested countries to study the Mosul District impartially. And then, as though to emphasize the fact that this dispute was not one to be settled by the might of a great power, they sent out a general from Esthonia, accompanied by a secretary, to keep the peace while the matter was being decided. One suggestion of accommodation was made after another. A point of law was decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. Gradually the tension was reduced. It took a long time and the danger of explosions was frequent, but at last the two parties got together and worked out a settlement. It is hard to believe that this agreement could have been reached, except for the moderating in-

fluence of the third party—representatives of countries that had not the remotest interest in whether Mosul should be held by Iraq or be given to Turkey.

The British feel—although they were at the time impatient with the slow and deliberate methods of the League—that they were saved from a war which would have taxed their resources severely for no commensurate gain.

Time after time, in a score of threatening conflicts—from the Swedish-Finnish dispute over the Aaland Islands to the latest war-scare over Vilna—the influence of the third party has made itself felt. The interest of this third party is peace.

We are all cheered by the news of improved relations with Mexico. But we cannot always hope to have a Morrow and a Lindbergh as our ambassadors, nor can we find men of their caliber for all our posts in Latin America. Unfortunately we must expect in the future, as has been so frequently the case in the past, misunderstandings and controversies with our neighbors to the South. I find no reason to hope that any method will be found to prevent such differences of opinion and conflicts of interest from arising. Modern diplomacy is working out means to prevent such disputes from being carried on *à deux,* with machine guns and airplanes. The new methods which are being tried out at Geneva are based on the conviction that they can be more satisfactorily settled with the aid of third-party conciliation.

Of course, it is not an entirely new idea, nor an exclusively European conception. Mr. Wilson used this

procedure successfully when he invited the A. B. C. powers of South America to the Niagara Conference to assist us in finding the basis of an accord with Mexico.

The great advantage of the new machinery at Geneva—recognized by all who have used it—is that this third-party influence, which formerly came into play only occasionally, has been rendered automatic. If I were trying "to sell the new model," I would make this "third-party lubricating contrivance"—or perhaps it should be described as a "shock absorber" —my principal talking point. We, in our relations with our weak and turbulent neighbors, more than almost any other nation in the world have need of this modern method.

The variety of problems which our Government faces in its relations to our Southern neighbors has already inspired many books and is worthy of many more, but, although it would take much more time than is available to treat it exhaustively, there are certain aspects of it which we can consider in connection with this new machinery at Geneva.

First of all there is the broad question of what are the proper relations—ethically respectable, politically expedient, economically profitable—between industrially advanced and industrially backward or undeveloped nations. This is a question which at once stirs flaming prejudices and much loose talk. It is fashionable these days to attack the imperialistic sins of the great powers—and they have been heinous. But we must not forget that size has little to do with it. The worst scandals of recent times have been the

fault of small powers. Happily real progress is reported in the relations of Belgium with the natives of the Congo Free State, but no great power is today under so severe criticism about its relations with the weak as is Portugal in the administration of its African colonies.

If there is any simple answer to the question, nobody has yet found it. It is not unlike the question of the relation between employer and employed. Plainly the answer is different for a great corporation and a housewife with one maid. The problem is equally varied in the international realm. At one end there is frank and raw colonialism, ably described by Sir Sidney Olivier in his book—*White Capital and Black Labor*. It runs through various gradations of the dealings of the industrially strong with weaker, but independent nations—railroad building in Turkey, mines in Siam, concessions in Mexico or Persia or Soviet Russia, stabilization loans for Austria or Poland. It grades off into the relations between equals, such as the credit transactions whereby our bankers helped the English to get back on the gold standard.

Our problem with our southern neighbors must be fitted into this complex background, but that is only part of the complexity. Our relations with the A. B. C. powers of South America differ from those with the Central American Republics, not only because of relative power, but also because of distance, trade contacts, political stability.

It has been our practice in the past, under the vague formula of the Monroe Doctrine, to assert our

"sole responsibility" for this Latin American area, just as other powers have marked out other areas, as their "spheres of influence" and their "sole responsibility." If for instance we had tried to extend our system of government to Afghanistan, Tibet or the neighborhood of the Suez Canal, the British would have become just as excited as we did when we thought that they were taking liberties with the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuela affair. The Japanese feel much the same about Manchuria, the French about parts of Africa and the Italians about the Adriatic.

However, modern diplomacy tends to develop the idea of joint responsibility. There is a growing feeling that two-party argument between the strong and the weak too easily degenerates into the use of airplanes and machine guns.

This old, traditional method has disadvantages—to the strong, to the weak, and to the world at large—which outweigh the advantages. This must not be overstated; it is only a tendency, not an accepted doctrine.

The tendency is shown in many ways. I have spoken of the Mosul Controversy. The financial rehabilitation of Austria is another example. No one country, no matter how strong financially, could have done that job without reducing Austria to slavery. The Mandate System is working in the same direction, gradually building up a new jurisprudence in this very matter. Technically the Mandate Commission has authority only in certain definite territories, but inevitably the standards set up in the area under

the supervision of the League influence the practice throughout the colonial world.

If our Government employed the machine at Geneva—the post-War model of the diplomatic car —it would not alter the data of our problems with Latin America. It would not change the census reports of the various countries or their credit on the international exchange. It would not reduce the mileage from one capital to another, nor alter the racial contrasts nor perform any miracle like that. But whenever differences of opinion arose, as they inevitably will, whenever there was discussion of the rights and duties of the strong and the weak, there would be consultation, disinterested conciliation before the Marines were sent. And, if, as anyone familiar with the problem will think probable, we had to send Marines anyhow, it would not be an act of "sole responsibility," but international police action with joint and general support and approval.

My criticism of our traditional policy towards Latin America is that, for no appreciable gain to ourselves and largely for the benefit of others, we assume the heavy charge of "sole responsibility." In discussing this matter recently with some acquaintances in the Department of State, who know these Latin American countries, I said, in order to make my criticism concrete, that, if I were President, I would dash up to Congress with a message to the effect that I was tired of being the scapegoat and that I would never order our Marines to Latin America again, without first making public the correspondence with other governments, which urged me to do

so. "Can you cite a clear case," I asked these Latin American experts, "where we have intervened in Latin America solely to protect the lives and property of our own citizens? We are doing the work, meeting the casualties, largely for the benefit of others. The responsibility is really a joint one, but we accept the sole blame."

One of the men said that Nicaragua was an exception, that we had really acted there, as the President had said, in defense of our own interests. But he was at once contradicted by one of his colleagues, who had been a secretary there long before we sent Marines. "No," he said, "even there we were urged on by others. It is amusing that the proposal that we should intervene in Nicaragua was as far as I know first made by a Latin American diplomat. It was in the days when that picturesque and picaresque chap, Zelaya, enjoyed the title of Constitutional President and the pleasures of irresponsible tyranny. His Pretorian Guard killed the citizen of one of the South American Republics and the minister came to our Legation in a frenzy of rage. He had gone to the Presidential Palace to protest and Zelaya had said to him: 'When the British Minister protests, I snap my fingers; when the American Minister protests, I spit in his face—guess what I'll do to you, if you dare to protest.' As far as I know, it was this South American Minister who first urged our Government to intervene."

With the doubtful exception of Nicaragua, I have not been able to find a case where American armed forces have been used in Latin America, except under

pressure of other governments, who claimed the right to intervene themselves, if we were not prepared to protect foreign interest. It would be difficult to find a better example of the disadvantage of slavish adherence to the old tradition of secret diplomacy. Why our Government has not published the correspondence with other governments which brought about our intenvention in Haiti and San Domingo, I cannot imagine. Why should the Government allow our own people and the public of other countries to think that nobody but Yankees have investments in Nicaragua, concessions in Mexico, that we are the only people in the oil business down there and interested in these new oil laws?

The Monroe Doctrine, like everything else, has its bad sides as well as its good sides. On the whole, it seems to me that our refusal to define it, to state clearly what our commitments are, tends to exaggerate its evils and minimize its advantages. President Roosevelt tried to reduce the extent of our obligations to police Latin America. He said, in a message to Congress: "We do not guarantee any State against punishment, if it misconducts itself, provided the punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." But he was very quickly forced to change his position, when Germany attempted to punish Venezuela. There is no practical way for a non-American power to punish an American Republic, except by acquisition of territory. We, therefore, find ourselves in the position of "sole responsibility," not only for the protection of our own interests, but also for those of others.

All that is necessary to start our Marines on a jungle campaign is for some ambassador at Washington to call at the State Department and say that the Republic of Todos los Santos has proved its inability to protect foreigners and to observe its international obligations, and that, with all due respect for the Monroe Doctrine, his government, unless we can restore order, will be reluctantly compelled to rely on its own forces for the protection of its citizens.

This is so well understood that in some of the more tumultuous Latin American Republics a special procedure has become traditional, almost classic. If a politician feels that his cause will be advanced by American intervention, he raids a British Coffee Finka or kidnaps a French governess. He knows that our quaint Government is slow to anger if only American lives are lost, but that Uncle Sam gets mad if hit on this Monroe Doctrine funny-bone. If he can only get some non-American power to give it a crack, the reflex action is certain.

We have drifted in Latin America into a position not dissimilar to that of the British in China. They fought the so-called Opium War and have been cursed for it ever since. They have forced open "treaty ports" and have torn territorial concessions "from the bleeding body of China." We Americans are altogether too high-minded to do anything like that, but we do business in their concessions. In the same way we are burning our fingers in Latin America, pulling chestnuts out of the fire for others.

I believe that it is an error in policy for us to assume, or to allow others to force on us, sole re-

sponsibility for what Mr. Hughes euphemistically calls "interposition." Modern diplomacy tends more and more towards the idea that the preservation of peace, the maintenance and development of civilization, are joint responsibilities. If our Government were in a position to use the new machinery at Geneva, it would find many of its problems with Latin America greatly simplified. Conflicts of interest, long before they became acute controversies, would receive attention, often they would be reduced by the conciliatory action of the third party. If, as is our claim and only justification for intervention, government broke down in one of these countries and it became necessary for "superior civilization" to assert the "right of eminent domain," our Marines would go into action with the approval of the world and would not be held up to scorn as the "Agents of Wall Street Imperialism." There is also a fair chance that they would not have to go into action so often.

One more illustration. The most serious controversy of the day on our hemisphere is the Tacna-Arica frontier dispute between Peru and Chile. At the first Assembly of the League, the Peruvian Government tried to have the matter referred to Geneva. The leading members of the League were so apprehensive of accidentally hitting Uncle Sam's funny-bone, that they walked the Peruvian delegate up and down the lobby, round and round the garden, pleading with him not to force the issue. At last his resistance was worn down and he agreed to refer the matter to Washington. I believe that at the time our Administration was full of glee at this victory

of the Monroe Doctrine over the League. But I imagine that now they wish that the League had adopted that baby, instead of leaving it on our doorstep.

I have been greatly impressed by the success of the League in dealing with similar difficult questions, but I doubt if Geneva could have solved this problem any more satisfactorily than Washington. But even if their failure had been as bad as ours—and it could not have been worse—our position would have been very much better. We asumed "sole responsibility" and so must accept the sole humiliation of failure. General Pershing is not a hero, in South America. The victor of St. Mihiel and the Argonne was defeated at Tacna-Arica. The solemn award of the President is laughed at. And Washington is still at a loss to determine what to do. Shall we act as policeman and enforce the decision we gave as judge? Shall we accept the affront and the loss of prestige? The League would probably have been no more successful than we—for the first requisite of a settlement, an honest desire to come to terms, was lacking—but we should certainly be in a much less embarrassing position if we had not tried the old-fashioned "sole responsibility" method. This new shock-absorber would be of great use to us in dealing with Latin America. If we consider the League of Nations only as a mechanism, as a labor-saving device, an improved tool in the conduct of international relations; if we ignore its high purpose, the aspirations it has encouraged, the human hopes it has fortified; if we ignore its value as a means of educating

world opinion on the vastly complicated and vastly important problems of world peace, our view is obviously inadequate. But what we can see from this viewpoint—limited and over-simplified as it is—is worth serious attention.

Considered only as an instrument, as an a-moral tool, the machinery of the League of Nations is a logical outgrowth of all that has preceded it. It could have been foretold from a careful reading of diplomatic history. Occasional and "extraordinary" envoys proved inadequate for the handling of bilateral business between the nations and were superseded by permanent legations and embassies. Discontinuous, *ad hoc* conferences have likewise proved inadequate for the rapidly increasing volume of widely international, multilateral affairs. Inevitably they are being superseded by permanently organized institutions for conference—of which the experiment at Geneva is the most comprehensive, the most modern and the most successful. Although our Government, with a conservatism which is not part of our national character, still clings to old-fashioned methods, it turns more and more frequently to the mechanism at Geneva.

There are other reasons why the League of Nations grows in prestige and power among its members, why the two non-members among the great powers—the United States and Soviet Russia—more and more frequently find it to their advantage to use it, but, if for no other reason, the League of Nations has come to stay, has become an important element in modern diplomacy, because it is a better machine.

II

AMERICA AND THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

I HAVE frequently been asked the definite and concise question, "Ought America to join the League?"

That is the question I planned to discuss in this chapter. But I cannot answer it. The answer must come not from any one individual, but from you and from the mass of our fellow citizens.

Suppose somebody asked you: "Ought I to join the church?" If you took the question and the questioner seriously, you could not answer offhand "Yes" or "No." You would wonder why he wanted to join the church. To make pleasant social connections? If that is the case, he might as well join the golf club. You would want to know whether he accepted the dogma of the church and sympathized with its corporate purposes. If not, he would benefit neither himself nor the church by joining. The frame of mind is more important than the ritualistic act. Many good men have never joined a church and membership will no more assure salvation than a ring guarantees wedded bliss.

So, if we would answer this question, we must try to find out whether America would be a good member of the League. If the answer is "No," we ought not to join. If the answer is "Yes," it does not make

so much difference whether we join or not. But if we are in sympathy with what this institution at Geneva is trying to do, if we find that our purposes are also its purposes, there are obvious advantages in playing with the team. Americans do not have to be taught the greater efficiency of organized, as against haphazard, effort. The real question is: "Does the machinery at Geneva serve our purpose?"

I have asked you to consider the League of Nations as a mechanism—a labor-saving device. Now, let us turn our attention to the material that goes in raw and comes out more or less finished. What is the purpose of this complicated system of diplomacy, wheels within wheels, foreign offices, ambassadors, conferences? It is impossible to judge a machine until we know what it is intended to do. So we turn our attention from "form" to "content."

The purpose of the machinery which has been erected at Geneva—as proved by the original blueprints and specifications of those who planned it, as shown by its organic law, as demonstrated by its operation, its daily activity—is to produce peace. Final judgment must rest on its achievements, on its performance in serving this purpose.

Do we want peace? Is that the real purpose of American diplomacy? It seems almost sacrilegious to raise such questions in this City of Brotherly Love. But let us think out the answer carefully. It is not enough that our lips should answer "Yes." Telling the truth is only half the battle. It is equally important to be believed.

The cold fact is that we have not convinced our

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neighbors of our will to peace. Our actions seem to others to deny our words. One of my predecessors in this series of Memorial Lectures discussed the tenets of the behaviorist school of psychology. In international life, at least, we shall find that neighbors judge each other by behavior rather than by professions of faith.

Of course the trouble comes, as is so often the case, from uncertainty of definition. What do we mean by "peace?" What picture does the word evoke in our minds? In those fateful days of July, 1914, every statesman of Europe professed a love of peace. But in retrospect we can see that their devotion to peace was little more than a desire to get what they thought their due, without having to fight for it.

"Racial unity" seemed a noble and worthy ideal to the Serbs—just as noble and worthy as "the integrity of the Hapsburg Realm" seemed to Austrians. "Loyalty to the Empire" did not seem in conflict with ideals of peace in London any more than the "manifest destiny of France," or "the legitimate aspirations of Italy" seemed in Paris or Rome. "Pan-Slavism" was held to be a beneficent ideal in Moscow just as "Pan-Germanism" appeared to its advocates in Berlin. Everybody talked of peace but dreamed of goals that could only be attained by war. So we must realize that some of our ideals, some of our national policies—even if we festoon them with olive branches, even if we drape them with the phraseologoy of peace—may seem sinister and menacing to our neighbors.

What is "peace"? The mere absence of fighting? When President Roosevelt boasted that he "took Panama"—and as you will remember, most of his fellow citizens applauded—the Colombians did not fight. They were too weak. But is getting what we want without fighting what we mean by "peace"? What should we mean by the word? The maintenance of the *Status Quo?* The establishment of law among the nations? Organized, active effort to adjust conflicts, to foresee and reduce discords, to restrain the violent?

The concept of peace, like every ideal, evolves and calls for new definition every generation. Since the Armistice an immense amount of thought has been expended on this subject. We, as a nation, have gone our own way in this matter, isolated from the main stream, but the rest of the world has worked at the problem in concert, has been engaged in a continuous discussion. Nations have answered nations, continents have called to continents, the peoples of the world, all the tribes of men, have debated together, united in trying to hammer out a workable definition of "peace in our times."

The results are being registered at Geneva. It is not only that the search for a definition has been the subject of a score of diplomatic conferences, not only that the problem has been discussed by Foreign Offices, it has come up from very much deeper strata than that. It has been the subject of newspaper polemics in every language. It has been the text of books and pamphlets by politicians and preachers, by soldiers and psychologists, by bankers and Bolsheviks.

It has been discussed by Chambers of Commerce, by organizations of veterans—like *La Federation Inter-Alliée des Ancients Combattants*—on such Forums as Philadelphia's in every land, in women's clubs and barracks, by students between games and classes. In obscure homes, wounded men have talked it over with their wives, while the children slept. War-widows have discussed it with their sons who were growing to military age.

So up from the firesides of countless villages, from Land's End to Yokohama, the stream of thought has flowed, in strange *patois* and varied languages, subjected to a thousand tests, filtered by searching criticism, to be at last registered in the tone and style of statesmen at Geneva.

Here we must make a short digression, if we would get a true picture of the process. We call our own politicians "statesmen," only after their death, but courtesy requires us to call the politicians of foreign countries "statesmen" while they still live. But we must not let this courtesy title mislead us. The statemen of the world who gather at Geneva are just like the people we call "politicians" at home. There is a saying at Washington that the principal business of a congressman is to keep on being a congressman. The principal business of statesmen is to keep on being statesmen. These men who go to Geneva to represent their countries are no more interested in peace—and no less—than are our politicians. They give a great deal more thought to it, talk about it a great deal more, because the constituents who elect them—who allow them to keep on being statesmen—

insist on it. Men like Briand and Stresemann are sent to Geneva time after time, because their efforts to stabilize peace have the support of the overwhelming majority of the voters at home. Again and again their Nationalist opponents could have thrown them out of office by some parliamentary trick and have not dared to do so, because of their unquestioned popular support. Our congressmen would give quite as much, and quite as effective consideration to the problem, if they felt that "keeping on being congressmen" depended on it.

This long discussion of what is peace, this effort to work out a viable definition, to which the "statesmen" at Geneva have given so much time—just because they are "politicians" needing the support of public opinion at home—much more than the increased efficiency as a machine of international relations, is the real and human significance of the League of Nations.

Out of this myriad-tongued discussion there has come, if not a short, sharp definition, at least a fairly clear theory of peace.

The anarchic claim that each nation is a law unto itself, that its rights are limited only by its might, and are to be determined by itself alone, must give place to the acceptance of joint responsibility. Machinery for the peaceful adjustment of international disputes must be created. Any nation which resorts to war before every possible means for pacific settlement has been exhausted, must be condemned as an aggressor, outlawed as a disturber of the peace. And the law-abiding nations must co-operate to restrain

the outlaw. The realm of law must be extended. The forces of peace must be organized.

The nub of the Geneva theory is the substitution of due process of law for the rule of violence. It calls for the abandonment by the nations of the claim that sovereignty is lawless. All the rest is mechanism to give effect to this central idea—the extension to the community of nations of the old Anglo-Saxon idea that the rights of the citizen shall be determined by a jury of his peers.

Under the traditional theory of sovereignty, if two nations, A and B, have a dispute, each determines for itself the extent of its "rights" and is entirely free to fight to obtain or preserve them. The new doctrine brings all the alphabet into the picture. Neither A nor B is free to set the world ablaze, until C and D and all the rest to Z have tried their hand at finding some peaceful solution—some formula of conciliation, some juridical decision, or arbitral compromise.

Article XI of the Covenant of the League formulates this idea, in what are perhaps the most revolutionary sentences in any modern state paper: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any member of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League." And again: "It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which

peace depends." The prevention of war is held to be of universal concern, a matter of joint responsibility.

Plainly those who think that this is what the word means must doubt our will to peace.

We reject the idea that anyone but ourselves—any jury of our peers—shall determine our rights. We will not consent to any general arbitration treaty. We deny responsibility for preserving anybody's peace but our own. We are not even very certain about that. The "White House Spokesman" seems to think the Constitution has given Congress a sort of divine right to declare war whenever it sees fit. And as for putting any limits on sovereignty—the bare idea throws the Senate into a fine frenzy.

Most of those who in other lands have been trying to work out a practical definition of "peace" are quite frankly bewildered at our attitude, at the contrast between our professions and behavior. But there is a group of political philosophers—they call themselves "realists"—who find in our action the confirmation of their theory. America, they say, is conscious of her growing strength and the strong have no use for peace.

The viewpoint of the *real politikers* is very old, it has a hoary tradition behind it. It was the only viewpoint known to the Pharaoh. It was taken for granted by the Cæsars. Machiavelli, when he wrote *The Prince* was merely recording old, established habits of behavior, as against belief. He drew his precepts from practice, rather than from preaching. The realists claim that only the weak desire the reign

of law. They make much of Nietzsche's famous distinction between *"Heeren"* and *"Herden"* ethics, the morality of the noble versus the morality of the mob. It was not the best and most successful duelists who took the lead in abolishing dueling. They insist that it is the small, weak nations, who have no hope of prevailing in battle, who want to establish peace. Talk of "outlawing war" is desperately earnest, they say, for those too weak to defend themselves, but the very opposite from practical politics for those who are strong enough to hope for loot.

We cannot overcome this point of view by ignoring it. We cannot answer it by calling it absurd or impious. There are hard, tough qualities to this type of thinking, which have made it persist through the ages. Nor can we accomplish anything by denouncing it as a European, un-American doctrine. For it is striking how these realists turn to American history to support their theory.

They can cite cases to show how, in our relatively weak adolescence as a nation, we were leaders in the movement for arbitration, but now that we have waxed in strength, our ardor in that cause has waned. Once in the front rank, we are now far in the rear. We have in recent weeks celebrated the Sesquicentennial of our first treaty of amity with France; both in Paris and Washington there have been memorial orations in honor of "Poor Richard," who was a Progressive in his day, but the new Arbitration Treaty which has been signed is not progressive. We agree, in case of a dispute with France, to submit a "special treaty" to the Senate and, if two-thirds

agree, to arbitrate. Even Mussolini, who loves to call himself a realist, has signed more advanced arbitration treaties than this. If one compares our record in this matter with that of post-War Europe, one is reminded of the character in Shaw's play, who "was a Liberal forty years ago."

These realists love to tell the story of the Central American Court. It was created by a treaty between the five Central American Republics, signed in Washington in 1907, and was to substitute law for war in that area. Mr. Carnegie donated an impressive building for this Tribunal. Things went relatively well with the Court, the Central American Republics took it seriously, although it had some defects, until we negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua by which, among other things, we acquired a naval base on Fonseca Bay. Suit was at once brought in this Court against Nicaragua, by Costa Rica in March and by Salvador in August, 1916.

Costa Rica claimed that this Bryan-Chamorro Treaty violated certain of its rights, which had been recognized by the Cañas-Jerez Treaty of 1858, by the arbitral award of President Cleveland in 1888, and by the General Treaty of Peace and Amity between the Central American Republics, which had been signed at Washington in 1907. Salvador maintained that the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty violated its rights as a co-owner of Fonseca Bay and that the establishment there of a naval base by a foreign power constituted a menace to her peace and safety.

Dr. Bustamente, in his book on the World Court, comments on the affair as follows:

"These two cases affected the interests of a third nation, not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court and not a party to the suits. So far as was possible, the Court avoided deciding anything that concerned this third party; aside from this, however, it upheld these two claims. . . . The Court held . . . that the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty by provision for the concession of a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca . . . did violate its (Salvador's) rights, as co-proprietor of the Gulf, as well as its rights under Article 2 and 11 of the Treaty of Peace and Amity of Washington; it held that the Government of Nicaragua was under obligation to use every means possible under international law to re-establish . . . the legal situation existing between the Republics before the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. Nicaragua refused to comply. . . ."

What did we do about this? Did we encourage Nicaragua to regularize her position with her neighbors and obey the order of the Court, which we had helped to establish to foster respect for international law among these turbulent Central American Republics? No. We ignored the whole incident. And this, say these realists, was common sense and practical politics. Why should a strong nation allow weaklings to deprive it of something it wants "by due process of law"? This Central American Court, its prestige shattered by our scornful rebuff, never had the courage to meet again.

The present situation in Nicaragua furnishes them an even more up-to-date argument. I am not well enough informed to judge the equities of that contro-

versy, nor wise enough to propose a happy solution of that unhappy problem. But why do we insist that the preservation of order in that distracted land is our "sole responsibility"? Why do we not find, or at least look for, some method of calling in our friends and peers among the nations to help us discover some less bloody way to settle this dispute? To be sure, it is a small-change affair. Only a few people are being killed. There is no likelihood of it spreading into a great war. But we cannot dismiss it like that. There is a principle at stake here as great as that behind "the paltry tax on tea." If we insist on keeping this a dialogue between the strong and the weak, to be determined by might, we cannot blame others who follow our example. Other nations, whose motives we like to think are less pure than ours, will accept our policy as a precedent. It is the same in substance as the "Black and Tan" regime in Ireland, as the Italian raid on Corfu, as the French bombardment of Damascus.

Why do we maintain that this is nobody's business but our own? The British showed a greater will to peace in their handling of the Mosul affair. They did not consider it beneath their dignity to ask other nations—even little Esthonia—to help them find some better way than violence. Our prestige was not lessened when Mr. Wilson asked Argentine, Brazil and Chile to help us out of our tangle in Mexico. Why in this case should we insist on being complainant, judge and executioner at once?

The realists have a ready answer. We are strong. If we rely on our strength, we shall get what we

want. If we allowed anything like a judicial review of our acts, the jury—in spite of our confidence in our own rectitude—might not let us have all we want. Law means nothing, these realists claim, unless it means limiting the strong.

And, they add, is it possible to find a better example of the rule that law is distasteful to the strong than the case of America?

One other illustration. During the summer of 1925, I sat for an hour or more with one of our Senators in the garden of the League of Nations Building in Geneva, looking out across the lake to the snow crest of Mont Blanc. We were discussing the proposal of American adhesion to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which the League established and maintains at The Hague. He was not one of the "Irreconcilables," he had consistenly supported the foreign policy of Mr. Wilson. But we came at last to a blind alley, from which I could find no escape.

"Personally," he said, "I am in favor of this Court, but I am afraid. I wish I could think that we are ready for that sort of thing, but we're still too near the frontier stage, too lawless.

"Suppose Mexico should cede some of its coast to a transoceanic power—trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific. Would we consider it a legal question? I know of no international law which prevents a sovereign state from ceding its territory. But if we found that some outsider was building a naval base in our neighborhood—would we get any comfort out of a court decision that it was perfectly legal? No. No matter

how many courts we had joined—no matter what the law was—we wouldn't stand for it."

Was he right? Do we want law? Or do we want our way? We cannot get milk and beefsteak from the same cow. There is an inherent conflict between the reign of law and the claim of super-legal sovereignty. The idea that each nation should determine for itself its own rights and the idea of organized peace are mutually exclusive. If this Senator was right, if—relying on our strength—we put our sovereign will above the law, we must admit that there is something more than cheap cynicism in this realist theory. There is a cold, steely glint to it.

However, all that glistens is not steel. If everybody—or even if most people—looked out on life from this realists' point of view, there would never be any peace anywhere, between nations or within them. No tribe could ever have been formed. This philosophy is challenged and denied on every hand by every successful partnership, by every hive of bees—even by every pack of wolves.

The opposing philosophy has quite as venerable a tradition. Long before a new era was preached on a mountainside in Galilee, every thoughtful man had noticed and given consideration to the social virtues, had seen how man's power is enhanced and multiplied by joint endeavor. The most modern research confirms Kropotkin's thesis that "mutual aid" has been as important a factor in the upswing of evolution as "the struggle for existence." It has been a vastly more important factor in civilization.

Even the realists' theory that law benefits only the

weak is challenged on every side. Rousseau preached the exact opposite. He held that laws are made for the protection of property.

There is something amusing in the way these schoolmen debate about the nature of law—does it favor the strong or the weak, the rich or the poor? Like most discussions based on a dualistic contrast, it is meaningless *in abstracto*. States Rights vs. Federal Centralization. The only way to put meaning into the dilemma is to tie it up with some concrete issue. Does any defender of the "Lost Cause" want to have local self-government applied to coinage—forty-eight different currencies in these United States? Does any devout Unionist advocate substituting a national *gendarmerie* for local police, or the abolition of State Universities? Such discussion is absurd, unless you know the concrete thing to which the abstract theory will be applied.

So it is with this dreary discussion of law in the abstract. In practice any specific law may favor one extreme—rich or poor—against the others. Its validity, however, rests on the support of the middle mass. We all criticise the laws in detail but support them wholesale. Millions of Americans want to amend the Constitution—or unamend it—but practically no one wants to abolish it.

The most surprising—and for a philosopher the most amusing—thing about this whole controversy over law, is the suspicion with which our innate conservatism regards any extension or innovation in law. My friend Charles P. Howland wrote a very interesting pamphlet comparing the psychology of those

who opposed the League in the discussions of 1919, with those who opposed the Constitution in 1788.

In the New York Convention of 1788, a speaker argued against the Constitution, "because I think it is morally certain that this new Government will be administered by the wealthy." Mr. Singletary of Massachusetts said: "These lawyers and men of learning and money men, that talk so finely and gloss over matters so smoothly, to make us poor, illiterate people swallow down the pill, expect to get into Congress themselves; they expect to be the managers of this Constitution and to get all the power and all the money into their own hands, and then they will swallow up all us little folks, like the great Leviathan, Mr. President, yes, just as the whale swallowed up Jonah." Patrick Henry, who had been a patriot in his day and still thought himself one, cried out—even as he had dared the English King: "This Government subjects everything to the Northern majority. We thus put unbounded power over our property in hands not having a common interest with us. . . . Sir, this is a picture so horrid, so wretched, so dreadful, that I need no longer dwell upon it." Mr. George Mason, one of Washington's neighbors, "apprehended the possibility of Congress calling on the militia of Georgia to quell disturbances in New Hampshire."

One more example. Mr. Tredwell of New York burst out into an oratorical appeal to vague fears that could not be rivalled by any of our living Senators. "Is this, Sir," he demanded, "a government of free men? Are we thus to be duped of our liberties? . . . We ought, Sir, to consider that we may now give

away by a vote what it may cost the dying groans of thousands to recover; that we may now surrender with a little ink what it may cost seas of blood to regain, the dagger of ambition is now pointed at the fair bosom of liberty and to deepen and complete the tragedy, we, her sons, are called upon to give the fatal thrust."

As a matter of fact, most modern historical students agree with Professor Beard that the framers of the Constitution, in their Convention in Philadelphia, shared Rousseau's theory that the purpose of law was the defense of property; they sought a legal structure which would protect the well-to-do from the envy of the disinherited masses, but they builded better than they knew. When the "Great Unwashed," whom the framers had tried so cannily to exclude from the Government, won to power, first under Jefferson, again under Jackson, then under Lincoln, we find them appealing to this same Constitution as the bulwark of their rights.

We have an instructive and somewhat amusing illustration of this point in our more recent domestic politics. When the Federal Reserve System was under discussion, in the first days of the Wilson regime, it appeared to be a case of what Nietzsche and his realist followers call "slave morality," an attempt of the little fellows to clip the wings of the big fellows, an attempt to rob the great banks of the East of the prerogatives of their power. It was violently opposed by almost all our important financiers. It is hard to believe one's eyes today in reading what was written in opposition to the proposed law at that time, for

today it would be difficult to find a single influential banker who favors its repeal. Law is neither the sword of the strong nor the shield of the weak, it is the basic need of community life.

Law does not give us what we want, nor does it even assure us of what we consider justice. In the great majority of civil cases, both sides come away from court feeling that justice has been denied them. We support our judicial system, not because we think it is perfect, but because the common sense of the community is conviced that due process of law is preferable to dueling.

The debate between philosophers of the individualistic, anarchistic and the socialistic, law-supporting types of mind will go on interminably, but this question of war or peace will not be settled by logic. Politics abhors logical extreme, just as nature abhors a vacuum.

The "struggle for existence"—which the realists make the corner stone of their philosophy—eliminates extremes. It favors approach to the norm. It is just as hostile to pure realists as it is to pure idealists. The raw materials of politics are men and women like ourselves who are not pure logicians. Utopia demands perfectly law-abiding citizens. But our human—all-too-human—society manages to scrape along with fairly law abiding citizens like myself. I have an unpleasant feeling when I am reminded of things I got through the Custom House without declaring them, a strong enough feeling of distaste to keep me from smuggling on a large scale. I really try to observe traffic regulations—always when there

is a policeman in sight. This is un-philosophical, if you like, but it is life. It is reasonable to hope for a somewhat similar respect for legality on the part of nations—perhaps not perfect, but enough.

In fact, I am brought to the conclusion that the establishment of legal relations between nations, the organization and preservation of peace, is a matter of practical politics, for the strong as well as the weak, not because of idealistic considerations, but by studying that symbol of materialism—the balance sheet. Herbert Spencer gave great weight to the argument that a rapidly industrializing age would find it necessary to abolish war. It is a greater waste than our type of civilization can afford. Arguments from two quarters converge on the same conclusion. First: What we can hope to win in the spoils of war grows steadily smaller in relation to the normal profits of peace. A larger and larger proportion of citizens in our modern democracies have a stake in uninterrupted trade, fewer and fewer have any expectation of sharing in loot. There is more to be gotten out of peace, there is less in war than there used to be. Second: War is vastly more destructive to industry than to agriculture. Compare the ravages made by invading armies in Serbia and Belgium. Nature quickly heals the wounds of the country-side, but nature cannot rebuild a manufacturing city. A year or two and the farm forgets the foray—one or two crops are lost. The mere passage of time will not mend a broken machine nor restore the fertility of investments. Credit, like a ruined factory, must be rebuilt from the foundations. If war interferes with

business, these realists say, give up business. It is quite certain that we shall have to give up one or the other. In present-day Europe, the business men are among those who are working most effectively for peace. Locarno was the work not only of the Parties of the Left in France, but also of the Industrialists of Germany.

"But you can't change human nature," the realists assert.

Well, not for the sake of argument, but rather to avoid argument, I will agree. It strengthens my position. The most distinctive thing about this human nature of ours is its will to live, its instinct of self-preservation. This instinct has driven our ancestors to change their habits frequently, more—it has forced them to change their bodily structure. When they came down from the trees and found that their tails tripped them up—got in the way of their progress—they rid themselves of their tails.

We come from a tremendously tenacious stock. The heritage of courage, which our forebears handed down to us, is our patent of nobility. Think of the trials and calamities our fathers faced and outfaced! Think of those ages when the Arctic ice cap crept relentlessly south! How many, many times those ancestors of ours—their brains unlit by any written word, their hearts knowing no solace of religion—were driven from newly established homes by the encroachment of the ice! Driven, driven by a power far beyond their comprehension, they kept their faith with life. If we, sprung from such loins, have to choose between war and life, the thing that is most

unchanging in human nature will force us to give up war.

These realists, if you argue them out of every other position, take a last stand on sheer pessimism. They love to see ghosts. There can be no such thing, they insist, as an absolute guarantee against war. But I see no reason for arguing the problem of peace—or any other problem of politics—in terms of the absolute. Leave that to the metaphysicians. The practical problem, if we want peace, is to try to invent ways to make war relatively less frequent. If we prefer peace to war, it is to our interest to get as much peace as possible and that should be the goal of our diplomatic endeavor.

Shall we neglect this interest because some Cassandra—

"Prophet of Plagues, forever boding ill,
Augur accurst, foretelling mischief still"—

croaks that the Fates have written the doom of war on our foreheads? Because somebody who has read Machiavelli—in translation—tells us that we cannot hope to have more sense than the petty princelets of Renaissance Italy? Because some amateur superman chants that a good war justifies any cause? Possibly we shall fail to attain the absolute, but that does not lessen our interest in trying to get all we can.

To some—unfortunately, not enough—it is sufficient that religion teaches that war is sin. To those who seek earthly guidance in matters of ethics, Immanuel Kant's *Essay on Perpetual Peace* is an unanswerable argument. To those who listen only to the materialistic language of clinking coins, I submit

the balance sheet. If this be idealism—make the most of it. At least I am in stalwart company.

Even the discussion of politics makes strange bedfellows. In defending the thesis that the object of American diplomacy is the preservation of peace, I find myself between the same four posts as President Roosevelt. His speeches and writings on behalf of the old League to Enforce Peace show an uncanny provision of the theory of organized peace which they are working out in Geneva. William McDougall one of our most eminent psychologists, in his small, but profound book—*Janus, The Conquest of War*—quotes these words from President Roosevelt: "From the international standpoint the essential thing to do is effectively to put the combined power of civilization back of the collective purpose of civilization to secure justice. This can be achieved only by a world league for the peace of righteousness, which would guarantee to enforce by the combined strength of all nations the decrees of a competent and impartial court against any recalcitrant and offending nation."

* * *

Towards the end of 1914, I encountered Mr. Roosevelt in the *Outlook* office and asked him some questions about American participation in the Conference of Algeciras.

"That reminds me," he said, "Henry White, our Ambassador at Madrid, whom I sent to Algeciras, wants to talk to me about that. We must lunch together."

A few days later his secretary called me up and made and appointment. Both Mr. White and I

urged the ex-President to put what he told us that day in writing. I regret that he did not do so and that I must rely on my memory. I cannot hope to reproduce his vivid manner and phrase, his incisive, dramatic way of telling the story.

There is an interesting chapter on this Conference in the recently published volume—*Adventures in American Diplomacy,* by Professor Alfred Dennis. The story, as he reconstructs it from the documents, differs in detail from the way Roosevelt told it to Mr. White and myself, but does not contradict it in any important point. The controversy between France and Germany over the future of Morocco grew serious at a time when Mr. Roosevelt was giving all the attention he could spare for foreign affairs to the Russo-Japanese settlement. He had rather taken the Kaiser's side in urging France to agree to discuss the whole matter in a conference. But the wrangle did not seem to touch us directly and he was surprised to get a formal invitation to participate in the conference. He received a long memorandum from the Department of State on the subject, which—as he said—began with the Flood. We had signed the Treaty of Madrid in 1880, in which the Sultan of Morocco had pledged "most favored nation treatment" to all the signatories and, as the proposed conference at Algeciras was to revise the old treaty, we had been invited. There was an annex to the memorandum headed "Trade Relations With Morocco." In the last year for which statistics were available, our trade with Morocco had amounted to two schooner cargoes of goat skins for Philadelphia glove manu-

facturers. That seemed the high spot to Roosevelt and he returned the memorandum with notation: "Goat skins not good enough. Refuse."

Then, he told us, he tried to forget it. But Jusserand, the Ambassador of France, would not let him. The matter kept bobbing up. One day, Mr. Roosevelt said, the French and British Ambassadors asked to be received together. That was serious, what is called a *joint démarche.*

Jusserand regretted bringing up again a subject they had so often discussed, but he had been instructed by his government to do so and his British colleague had been instructed to join him in urging the President to reconsider his refusal to participate in this conference. "Then," Roosevelt told us, "he dropped his formal manner and made a personal appeal and you know his engaging frankness. I never saw him so deeply moved, so dead in earnest. 'It isn't a question of what happens to Morocco,' he said, 'It's a question of what happens to Europe. The peace of the world is at stake.' "

Roosevelt felt that he could not ignore such an appeal and, promising to give the matter further consideration, dismissed them. He sent for the German Ambassador, von Sternburg, whom he found cautious and non-committal. Morocco was not on his beat, he didn't know much about it. He would not go as far as Jusserand, but he admitted that the situation was "grave." Roosevelt received from him an even stronger impression that a general war was not improbable.

"Well," Roosevelt said to us, "A few goat skins

did not interest me, but the peace of the world is another matter. We are—we can't help being—interested in that. So, Henry, I told the State Department to send you."

"It is interesting to know how it came about," Mr. White said, "I knew you had refused the first invitation and I was never more surprised in my life than when I got the order to go. I always wanted to know what changed your mind."

Roosevelt drafted the instructions for Ambassador White himself. "I made them short and sweet," he said, "three points. First: You are to be on the alert to protect American interests. Second: Where American interests are not directly involved, you are to vote with the majority, to facilitate unanimity. Third: If war threatens, you are to use all your influence to preserve peace. Is my memory right, Henry?" Mr. White said it was remarkable.

Such were the formal instructions, but Roosevelt also wrote a personal letter to Mr. White. It told about the two cargoes of goat skins; said that America had little direct interest in Morocco; that it was our policy to keep out of European political quarrels, that any settlement of the pending questions which was acceptable to the European powers would—if based on the Open Door principle—be acceptable to us. The letter went on to say that the President had given the matter careful consideration and had reached the conclusion that the points at issue were all of minor importance and could be easily adjusted, if they were studied with a desire for accord—certainly they were far too petty to justify a war. He

personally would feel that any government which forced a fight over such insignificant disagreements would be guilty of wantonly disturbing the peace and that he was further convinced that the people of the United States would agree with him in this and back him up in whatever action might be necessary. There was a postscript, authorizing Mr. White to show the letter, if circumstances should arise, which made him think that this frank expression of the President's opinion would serve the cause of peace.

"The Department of State," Roosevelt said, "balked at that letter. They said it didn't mean anything unless it meant a threat. I said, I meant it for a threat—so it went. That's my side of the story, Henry. Now let's hear yours."

"As you know," Mr. White said, "there wasn't any war." Then he told us his experiences in considerable detail. On his arrival at Algeciras there had been great curiosity among the other diplomats about his instructions and his probable actions, he had been strenuously courted by both sides. He had kept his own counsel, sitting back during the meetings, voting with the majority whenever there was a prospect of unanimity, taking little part in the discussions, intervening only once or twice to strengthen some phrase about equality of commercial opportunity, but feeling with growing definiteness, as the discussions proceeded, that it was largely sparring for an opening, that the real issue was not Morocco but *Weltpolitik,* that inevitably the climax would be an attempt by Germany to humiliate France under a threat of war. One day the expected crisis came. The chief German

delegate, von Tattenbach, read a statement, evidently drafted in Berlin, which—although it dealt only with the nationality of the chief of police in a small Moroccan port—was in effect an ultimatum which France could not accept. In dismay, the chairman of the conference adjourned the sitting and White, inviting von Tattenbach to tea, showed him Roosevelt's private letter.

Mr. White laughed as he recalled the incident. "I had the devil of a time convincing Tattenbach that it was authentic. It was so informal. He was not used to receiving letters from the Kaiser addressed, as yours was, 'My dear Henry.' But at last it sank in."

Von Tattenbach took a copy of the letter and begged White to ask the chairman to adjourn the conference for forty-eight hours. He feared that it would weaken his position, if he asked for adjournment himself. This delay furnished the time for an exchange of cables between White and the President and between Washington and Berlin. Forty-eight hours later, when the conference met, von Tattenbach made a flowery speech about the Kaiser's love of peace and read a new statement from Berlin, which the French could accept without humiliation. "That letter," Mr. White said, "turned the trick. Peace was preserved."

"No decision I ever had to make while I was President," Roosevelt said, "seemed more simple and clear than this. A fool can see that our diplomacy, if it is adapted to our peculiar situation, must differ from that of the rest of the world. Of course we have certain rights and interests all over the map,

just like everybody else, and it is the business of our diplomats to protect those interests. But in most of the wrangles which occupy the Foreign Offices of the world, the general worries of European diplomacy, we have no concern. However, our predominant interest beyond our own frontiers—overshadowing every other interest—is the preservation of peace. America has nothing to gain from war. Anywhere, anytime, war means loss to us—sheer loss. Look at this war in Europe—the moral outrage of it—the intellectual stupidity—the economic destruction.

"Our diplomats have routine work to do, protecting American interests abroad. They should keep out of European disputes that do not concern us. But if peace is menaced—that does concern us—then we ought to go in with all we've got. We should keep out of alliances. We should never tie up with one group against another—but all the world ought to know that we're allies of peace."

As he banged the table with his fist, it seemed to hold the legendary Big Stick. Mr. Roosevelt did not believe in justice without a sword.

In his attitude towards this Conference of Algeciras, Mr. Roosevelt was more realistic than the self-styled "realists." To ignore the repugnance of the great mass of American people to a policy of war is to be willfully blind. The idea of war shocks whatever religious or moral feelings we may have. It appears to our intelligence as the stupidest way of settling controversies. And from the materialistic, balance-sheet point of view it is unutterable waste.

I believe Mr. Roosevelt was right when he told

the Kaiser that the American people would see the problem as he did and back him up in whatever action was necessary to preserve the peace or to make things uncomfortable for any nation that lightly disturbed it. Those instructions—"short and sweet"—which he sent to Ambassador White at Algeciras should be engraved and posted in every one of our consulates, legations and embassies, as standing orders to our Foreign Service.

If Roosevelt was right—if our predominant interest beyond our own frontiers is the preservation of peace—we must regard this experiment at Geneva not merely as an improved mechanism for the transaction of routine international business, but also as a tool of possible use to us in achieving the fundamental purpose of our diplomacy. The day when any one nation can autocratically impose peace on the world, as the Caesars established their *Pax Romana,* is long past. Peace in our times must be a joint enterprise. The League of Nations is an attempt to achieve what President Roosevelt, as well as President Wilson, considered to be the predominant objective of American diplomacy.

* * *

Convinced myself that we would promote our own national interests by wholehearted participation in this enterprise, I have tried very earnestly to understand why the contrary opinion has so far prevailed. The President of Columbia University has recently explained it on the ground of "Mr. Wilson's unfortunate dislike of Senator Lodge and Senator Lodge's unfortunate dislike of Mr. Wilson." We all recall

the intense bitterness of that feud and the larger and equally bitter struggle of the two political parties. But this explanation does not seem to me adequate.

After all, the Republican victory of 1920 was overwhelming. Mr. Wilson's dislikes no longer counted. Why did not the new Administration follow the advice of its "best minds"? Roosevelt, Taft, Root, Hughes, Hoover, Coolidge were all on record in favor of the League of Nations. More than two-thirds of the Senate, on both sides of the aisle, had voted to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The disagreement came not over the substance but over the form of the reservations. The personal feud explanation hardly explains.

Convinced, as I said, that our national interests would be forwarded by membership in the League, very jealous of my country's fame, very earnest in my desire that we should be revered for our wisdom as well as envied for our wealth, that we should be respected for our good citizenship as well as feared because of our size and power, I am not always able to maintain a passionless calm in my effort to understand. Often I have recited the old prayer: "Oh! That I might see the face of mine enemy." In trying to discern the features of that face, I find three important groups among my fellow citizens, who stand in the way of any effective co-operation with other nations in the effort to organize peace, who obstruct any joint endeavor to extend the realm of law among the nations.

First, most obvious, if least important, are our "war hawks." No country which I have ever visited

is without these advocates of violence and we, ever since this name was invented in Jefferson's Administration, have had our share. Few of them are in uniform. History is very explicit in this matter. From the days of Demosthenes, it has been the political orator rather than the soldier or sailor, who has been most inflammatory. A few of these war hawks have something definite in mind which they want us to do and which would be rendered more difficult by acceptance of any legal restraints. Some hold that it is our "manifest destiny" to extend our dominion in this hemisphere—at least as far as the Canal. Some have "legitimate aspirations" in the Far East that could not be realized without a fight. Some believe that it should be our policy to wrest the "rule of the waves" from the British and exercise it to our profit as ruthlessly as they have done. More have no definite lawlessness in mind, but, like the Senator to whom I referred, can imagine circumstances in which we would refuse to recognize the right of anyone to raise legal objections to what we might want to do. Some are so convinced of our innate superiority over other nations that the idea of letting "foreigners"—*Minderwertigvolk,* as some German writers used to call their neighbors—pass judgment on our acts, seems to them a moral lapse, a surrender to unrighteousness.

The Senate has always refused any general arbitration treaty. In every case there must be a special treaty consented to by two-thirds of the Senate. This means that we will arbitrate not to find out if we are right, not because we think we are right, but only

when we think we shall win. This point of view is very clearly expressed in the Congressional Record reports of the debates on the World Court. There was discussion of "Debts," not only the debts which some countries are reluctant to pay us, but also those which some of our states have repudiated. Objection was raised to adhesion to a court which might pass judgment in these matters. You cannot avoid the conclusion, if you read the verbatim report of those debates, that some of our senators were worried not because they feared that justice would be denied us, but because they feared that justice would prevail.

America can do no wrong. Law may be good for other people, for inferior races, but we are a supernation, above the law. Should any dare oppose us, should any quibble with us about law, let them beware. Our sword is sharp. Our strength is immense and growing. Besides we are right, because it's us!

When I describe this war hawk, do not think I am drawing a baseless caricature. I do not believe that anyone feels quite like that all the time. The trouble comes because we all feel like that some of the time. A few weeks ago I was discussing the Nicaragua affair with a Spanish friend. I condemn our Government severely in this matter, but I did not like to hear him do it. We became somewhat heated. I went much farther in justifying our actions than I would in discussing it with Americans. Although I know that the theory that we, or any other nation, should act as complainant, judge and executioner at once is in conflict with the theory of peace in which I believe, as it is in conflict with all our Anglo-Saxon ideas of fair

play, it makes a war hawk out of me to hear a foreigner say so.

This attitude of swagger, this belief that our superior righteousness puts us above the law, this resentment at the bare idea that others should have the effrontery to criticize us—which trips up those of us who are trying hardest to see things more truly—is popular. This war hawk viewpoint is the text for editorials in some of our most widely circulated dailies and weeklies. It finds loud expression on the floor of Congress and on the public platform. But I do not believe that it is nearly as important as those who preach it seem to think. While it is *"Vurry Amurican,"* it is not the authentic voice of America.

The second group, while less heroic than the war hawks, is more common, more influential. Their philosophy is expressed in the slang phrase, "Let George do it." "Why should we bother?" they ask. "The preservation of peace is just as vital an interest for others as for us. Let them organize a League of Nations. Its every success is to our benefit. If they are willing to do it, why should we accept any obligations or risks? Let us profit wherever we may from the efforts of others. It is cheaper to let them defend our interest in the preservation of peace than to do it ourselves."

This is not a very generous attitude, but it seems to be the official policy of our Government. Since the first frank hostility to the League has given place to a policy advertised as "co-operation," our Government has with increasing frequency participated in conferences called by the League, but we do not pay our

way—even in money. The Department of State has recently announced the sending of a check of about $17,000.00 to Geneva for our share of the expenses of several conferences. It is a step in the right direction, but it does not begin to meet the cost of the preparatory and follow-up work of these conferences.

The money side of it is a small matter. The League is quite able to pay for the services it donates to us, is glad to do so. It is very much more serious that we do not contribute our share of influence towards the defense of our predominant interest—the preservation of peace. If we can get the roses without the thorns—why worry? This attitude of mind is more common among us—more obvious to outside observers—than we like to realize. Sacrifices, self-denial ordinances, the acceptance of obligations are fine for others, everything other nations are willing to do for the stabilization of peace makes this world, in which we have to live, more habitable for us—and benefits trade, besides. When others are willing to defend our interests, why disturb ourselves?

But of course the third group—the indifferent—is the greatest impediment to international co-operation and the most respectable. Happy is that nation which has no foreign policy. It is a waste of breath to scold our people for not taking more interest in world affairs. Happily they have never had to. The danger of invasion, the idea of a war imposed upon us by others, has never hung over our heads like the sword of Damocles, which casts its shadow on all the thinking of the Old World. When we consider the possibility of a future war, it is always as of something

which we shall be free to decide for ourselves, never as something which depends on others. It is perhaps the greatest of our blessings that we have not been forced by history to think of war and peace as much, as keenly as others have to.

Pondering over this problem of our attitude towards going into the work of organizing peace, I am reminded of our attitude towards going into the War. I came home from Europe—where nobody was thinking about anything but war—shortly after the elections of 1916, and I was amazed to find how few people here were thinking about it at all. A small and noisy minority were arguing that we ought to go in; an equally small and equally noisy minority were arguing that we ought to stay out. Almost everybody was worrying about things that seemed more important—the baby that was coming—the next installment on the Ford.

It was not the eloquence of the advocates of war that changed this indifference—in a few short months —into flaming enthusiasm. It was the logic of events.

And so I think about this problem of going into peace. I do not believe that those who are arguing against our working with the League—on the ground that we may want to fight some day, or that it is cheaper to let others pay our bills—have much influence. Nor do I flatter myself that the arguments of my friends who believe that our interests demand membership in the League will have much influence. The issue will be determined by the logic of events and I am pleased to feel that they are on our side.

We cannot anticipate any such sudden conquest of

indifference as that which amazed us and the world in the transition from 1916 to 1917. Peace is not so easily dramatized as war. No married couple can get themselves into the "news" by living happily together, but, if their quarrels show originality, they can "make the front page." For a week or more before the Council meeting of December, 1927, our newspapers were full of stories about a not very interesting town in Northeastern Europe, called Vilna. Poland and Lithuania threatened to mobilize and broke into the headlines. Then one day cable dispatches told that two men with unpronounceable names had shaken hands in the Council Room and promised not to fight. We have read very little about it since. Although the organization of peace is much less dramatic than a good war-scare, events grind out their logic ceaselessly. Opposition to the League is being worn down, slowly indifference is being overcome.

We, who are pro-Leaguers, find no little comfort, and considerable amusement in watching the gradual retreat of the Old Guard of Isolationists. Once upon a time our Government thought that it could ignore this enterprise at Geneva. For some months, under the Secretaryship of Mr. Hughes, the Department of State refused to answer, or even acknowledge, letters from the League of Nations. The Administration discouraged private citizens from co-operating with the League. The American members of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Hague were prevented from nominating candidates for the new Permanent Court of International Justice, an American citizen was

advised not to accept membership on the Mandate Commission of the League. We were told that the League was dead.

But these funeral wreaths were so obviously premature that it was necessary to retreat to a new line. It was officially stated that while the League might be of some use to poor, benighted Europe, it was no concern of ours. But this line of trenches was also found to be indefensible.

There was a strategic retreat to the position that there might be one good side to the League. Politically it was still a nefarious enterprise, but there might be no harm in its "humanitarian" work. Washington risked sending a representative to a Conference in Geneva on Anthrax. I looked up this unfamiliar word in a dictionary and found "Anthrax" defined as "splenic fever of sheep and cattle," however, it seemed to our not over-literal Department of State "human"-itarian. Experience proved that without loss of sovereignty or national disaster we could discuss such things at Geneva. We took a chance on the opium traffic and found the courage to discuss the protection of women and children. But, mumbling this word "humanitarian," our Government still felt that it would be unsafe to co-operate in any effort to prevent the crowning inhumanity of war.

This front held for some time, but the League began to consider other things, which interested other areas besides emotions. They began to discuss harbor dues, passport visas, barriers to trade, the financial reconstruction of Austria and things like that which affected the pocket-book area. So there was retreat

on another wing, our Government was forced to admit that the "financial and economic" work of this League was also free from dangerous "political complications." During 1927, I believe that we accepted every invitation from the League to conferences of this type. More and more they are studying, discussing, deciding things in Geneva which involve our interests to such an extent that we simply cannot afford to stay away. In the long run the stubbornness of facts prevails over the stubbornness of prejudice or indifference.

Gradually, and without discovering any convenient formula to cover the retreat, our Government has abandoned another line of trenches and has begun to take part in another kind of League activity, which cannot be described as either "humanitarian" or "economic." We started modestly to participate in the disarmament discussion at Geneva, with an "unofficial observer." Last spring we sent an imposing delegation to the Preparatory Commission and in midsummer we had a conference of our own at Geneva on the limitations of naval armaments and asked the League to lend us their rooms and to supply the secretarial staff. Our Government, while at present willing to talk over the purely technical side of armaments with other governments, insists that it would be a dangerous involvement to discuss the political aspects of the problem. It is willing to discuss the implements of war, but is not yet ready to discuss its causes.

It is over-easy to be sarcastic about this fumble-bumble policy. It has been an uncertain weather-

vane policy, swinging whichever way it was thought the votes were blowing.

Much distance remains to be covered before we have formulated and accepted an active, positive policy in foreign affairs, which will put us in gear with the modern movement for the organization of peace. And progress will be slow in covering this remaining distance, until we have real leadership—in Washington and throughout the country—leadership which will face the facts, and looking forward, not backward to old feuds, explain them to the people.

But the progress we have already made is impressive, if we recall the days when it was the official theory that the League was dead. It would be difficult today to find anyone in high position in Washington who does not admit that this enterprise at Geneva is not only "good for Europe," but of frequent utility to us. The argument against the League in Government circles—excepting of course the war hawks—has boiled down to the argument against paying for benefits received.

* * *

To sum up. First of all, in considering this problem, we must honestly make up our minds what we mean by the word "peace" and decide whether we really want it. If we do, we must be prepared to pay the price. No one nation can assure peace single-handed. It must be a joint endeavor, a co-operative enterprise. Some limitation of sovereignty is inevitable, if there is to be an extension of the realm of law. And, if we want peace, it is from this point of view that we must regard the League of Nations.

Do we, as a nation, agree with the doctrine, which was urged so strenuously by Roosevelt, as it was urged with such tenacity by Wilson, that the principal objective of our diplomacy, our predominant interest beyond our own frontiers, is the preservation of peace? Shall we ignore this interest? Shall we try to protect it? Shall we entrust its defense to others?

The attitude of our Government towards the League of Nations has evolved steadily, if reluctantly; frank hostility—the disguise of "unofficial observers"—more frequent, now practically constant, participation. Timidly, at first, as though fearful that the folks back home might object, now with more assurance, our Government makes use of this modern machinery at Geneva, has used it and found it good. It now definitely accepts the by-products, but has not yet dared to show any sympathy with its main purpose—the preservation of peace. It has utilized the League for the furtherance of our lesser purposes, but it still maintains what the Soviet Foreign Office calls "a negative attitude" when it is a question of our predominant interest in foreign affairs.

It does not seem to me probable that, as the situation is clarified by the relentless logic of the "news," overcoming such prejudices as those that so nearly defeated the Constitution a hundred and forty years ago—it does not seem probable to me that our people will consider it good policy, or even dignified, to entrust the defense of our predominant interest in foreign affairs to the good will of other nations.

That is as near as I can come to answering the question with which we started.

III

AMERICA AND THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT

MR. JAMES, the Paris correspondent of the New York Times, once condensed the controversy over armaments into a witticism. "Americans," he cabled, "believe that if Cain had not had a club, he would not have killed Abel. Europeans believe that if Abel had had a club, he would not have been killed." It is an amusing contrast, and, although not quite fair to either side, serves to remind us that there is more than one way of looking at this problem. There are, in fact, two quite different views in the matter.

On the one hand is the belief that, if there had been an impartial tribunal in Eden, friends about to suggest conciliation, plenty of good citizens who did not want to have their work disturbed and who were prepared to back up the police in restraining anybody who started a row, who threatened to disrupt the peace, there would not have been a fight and no need for anybody to carry a club.

A great many Europeans take this view—a growing number—but it is not confined to Europe. It was the central dogma of the old League to Enforce Peace, which flourished here a dozen years ago, under the chairmanship of ex-President, now Chief Justice

Taft. This was the theory on which Mr. Hughes worked so successfully in the Washington Arms Conference.

On the other hand is the theory that all that is necessary is to snatch the club away from Cain. It is surprising that so many people who consider themselves idealists should take so materialistic a view—putting the blame on "Arms," rather than on "the Man." President Coolidge, in organizing the Naval Conference last summer at Geneva, seems to have accepted this view and to have thought of the problem of armaments not as one of morals, or psychology or politics, but as merely "technical"—a matter of "types and tonnage." Having the sanction of the President, this is accepted by the rest of the world as the "official" Washington attitude and justifies Mr. James in describing it as the American view.

Before we go farther in the discussion of disarmament, we must stop to ask ourselves what we mean by the word. Does anyone mean the destruction of all military equipment? The Russians have made this proposal at a recent meeting in Geneva but have failed to convince the world of their sincerity. If it were accepted it would immensely weaken Russia in relation to the "capitalistic states," whom the Bolsheviki insist in considering their enemies. If we could imagine the sudden disappearance of every known instrument of war, the United States would be—even more obviously than today—the most powerful nation on earth. We could hammer our ploughshares into swords more rapidly than any other country.

Complete disarmament would give the industrialized nations of the world more power than they have today. None of the industrially backward countries —least of all Russia—wants complete disarmament and none of the countries, like our own, which are equipped for the quick and mass manufacture of munitions, has had the face to make a proposal, which would seem so menacing to the rest of the world.

The real problem is "the limitation and reduction" of armaments. How can we check the tendency to devote so large a percentage of our energy to the preparation for war? There is difference of opinion as to whether armaments create, or are created by, the danger of war. But no one disputes that the two are closely connected. Nations will not build up great armies and navies merely for the pleasure of seeing them parade. Nor will they disband their military establishments so long as they feel menaced by war. The Organization of Peace and the Reduction of Armaments are two sides of the same medal.

Few Americans—least of all, our spread-eagle Babbitts—realize our power as a nation, or its implications. America is strong not only in the things which show in the statistics of today—area, population, exports, loans, accumulation of gold in our banks and in our teeth—but more especially in the promise of tomorrow. We seem destined to wax in power. If we make up our mind to some policy and determine to put it through, we will probably prevail. It may take time to get our way but every year we get stronger.

During the Balkan Wars, I had an interview in Belgrade with Pashitch, the old Premier, who had guided his country through so many years of tribulation and tragedy and who was destined to live to see the realization of his dream of a Greater Serbia.

The Conference of Ambassadors, under the Presidency of Sir Edward Grey, was then sitting in London, reciting its magic incantations about the *Status Quo*. The Serbian Premier did not think highly of His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Pashitch sat there in his study, combing his fingers through his great white beard, telling me what he thought of Sir Edward Grey. It was a long and detailed Bill of Indictment. Grey had no comprehension of the issues at stake. Grey was being hoodwinked by the Austrians. Grey did not understand the ABC's of European politics. In short, Grey was a fool. Then the old Premier jumped up and paced the room. "You can't imagine," he cried, "how I envy that man! Think of him there in London with all the power of the British Empire behind him! He can afford to be wrong. A little man like me, I can't afford to be so stupid. If I made one-tenth of the mistakes he does, I wouldn't last a month—my little country would be wiped off the map."

We are in much the same relation to the rest of the world that Sir Edward Grey was to Pashitch. Might may not make right, but power has its privileges. It is our good fortune—and it is also our danger—that in these days we are very powerful. We do not have

to persuade other people that our view is reasonable—within a wide angle, we can bully them.

However, whether the present view of our Government in regard to disarmament is right or wrong, whether we can persuade others to accept it easily or only after long resistance, it is worth our while to try to understand the other view.

This other theory of how to get rid of the burden and danger of excessive armaments, while it did not originate at Geneva, has been developed there. The League of Nations has furnished a convenient forum for the discussion of this problem and the Covenant has laid a definite obligation on the member states. In the preamble is "the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war," and Article VIII. begins: "The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." The ideal is clearly stated, armies and navies are to be eliminated as factors in international competition and transformed into police for the preservation of peace. That is a large order, but it is one which the League of Nations cannot dodge.

Disarmament has been an item on the Order of Business of every Assembly of the League. Commission after commission has explored the various aspects of the problem. At least from the point of view of gathering information, laying a foundation of facts, real progress has been made.

One encouraging thing stands out from these inves-

tigations. We are in the midst of a process of disarming. Slowly—all too slowly—the world is reducing its armaments. There are fewer soldiers today than before the war. They are armed with more deadly weapons, but there are not so many of them. The estimates of the number of men under arms in Europe before the war range from four and three-quarters to five and a half million men. In 1927 the estimates run from three and a half to three and three-quarters million. This means a real reduction.

The progress has not been uniform. Germany and her Allies had sweeping reductions forced on them by the Peace Treaties. The British Army, which was relatively small before the War—their principal interest being in sea armaments—has been slightly reduced. Italy in 1914 claimed an army of 250,000 men, and in 1927 reported 246,000.

The only great power which shows a notable reduction is France. In 1913 about 230,000 young men were called to the colors for three years' military service. The annual contingent for 1928 is slightly more, 240,000, but under the new military law the term of service has been cut to one year. This means, as far as the conscript Home Army is concerned, a reduction to one-third of the pre-war standard. Against this there must be put the creation of a new volunteer, professional army, like ours, of 106,000. Figures presented to the French Parliament in the debate on the new army bill, show that in 1913 there were on the French Army rolls, including colonial and colored troops, 990,000 men, and that for 1928 the estimate is 523,769.

There have been some increases to put against these decreases. Change of frontiers make it very difficult to calculate percentages in the new countries of Eastern Europe. There has probably been some increase in those disturbed areas, although the burden of military service was heavy under the old Empires. Two small countries of Western Europe report increases. Spain, because of difficulties in Morocco and the dictatorship at home, has expanded her army, and Belgium, having decreased the length of military service, calls more of her young men to the colors.

In any comparison of the military establishments of 1927 in relation to those of 1913, our growth has been startling—both in numbers and expenditure. But a statement in percentages would be unfair and meaningless, as we started so near zero. Our army is still small from the European standard, it is only in seapower that our increases influence the policy of other countries. However, in spite of intensified preparation for war on our side of the Atlantic, there is evidence that the world as a whole is slowly disarming.

Various reasons are given in explanation of this slow—admittedly too slow—reduction of armaments. Parliaments are reluctant to vote heavy military budgets when there is such crying need of money for reconstruction work. Something of the sheen has been worn off uniforms, and the young men have a growing distaste for the unproductive idleness of the barracks, when they want to settle down and get married. But certainly the most important reason is that the war-hysteria recedes, people are getting calmer, less afraid. The very existence of the League

of Nations, the arbitration treaties and pacts of non-aggression which it has fostered, have had a quieting effect, have increased the sense of security.

Out of the long discussions at Geneva a clear conviction has taken shape. Armaments are only the symptom. The disease is fear. The belief that it is possible to reduce armaments by attacking the cause, by building up a legal system to increase security, that military statistics are like a clinical thermometer recording the rise or fall of the fear fever, that armaments are only an aspect of the larger political problem of stabilizing peace, is the distinctive thing about this other view.

A study of parliamentary history strengthens this conviction. In Paris and Berlin the governments always had a hard fight to secure a majority for their military budgets. Bismarck in his memoirs tells how he "manufactured" incidents on the French frontier, to scare the Reichstag into voting his army bills. It was the same in Paris, military appropriations were put across only by trotting out "the menace across the Rhine." No big navy bill, no army increase, has ever passed any parliament without the war lords waving the bloody shirt.

People do not waste money on guns unless they think they may have to use them. In the years before the War, in the period from 1865 to 1914, when Europe was piling up explosives in an almost geometrical progression, we were not afraid of attack and Congress never voted defense appropriations on anything like the scale which had become fashionable in the Old World. The sense of security—due to our

historical and geographical good luck—kept us from militarism.

We have had a most enlightening experience in this matter in the case of Mr. Wilbur's proposal of an immense naval program. All sorts of speeches are being made and editorials written to explain what happened to it. One congressman attributes its defeat to British propaganda, another to Moscow. An amateur sea lord says that the churches have become infected with Christian principles. Another blames it on women—Bolshevism in Bryn Mawr and the Communism of Mrs. Catt. Of course the obvious and adequate explanation is that the American people are not afraid.

But this unsuccessful effort to saddle us with tremendous naval expenses gives us the opportunity to study the mechanism by which armaments are built up, by which military programs are "sold" to the people.

Those who favored naval expansion knew that they could not get popular support for an aggressive program, they could not persuade us to buy weapons for a war of offense. They had to base their argument on national defense. There is no imminent menace to our territorial integrity. Our people are not worrying about invasion. But, as it was necessary to discover something to defend, we were told that other nations were jealous of our good fortune and that we must be prepared to defend ourselves against their possible attacks on our trade expansion.

I followed as carefully as I could the arguments in the case, notably those presented by Admiral Plunkett

and Theodore Roosevelt, the son of the President, as reported in the *New York Times* of January 22, 1928. They did not give any very clear definition of what it is that we should fear, but apparently these gentlemen wanted us to believe that it stands to reason that the British must resent our growth in power and prosperity and that the only thing for us to do about it is to build more ships and make them more resentful.

The nations which gather at Geneva to discuss this problem go at it in another way. Instead of exercising their ingenuity to think up possible reasons for increasing their armaments, they have set themselves the task of reducing the excuse for such expenditures by rendering war less probable, the menace more remote. These efforts were focused in the Protocol of 1924—the draft of a treaty "for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes." It is an elaborate and highly technical document, giving form to three principles, which appear in the slogan; "Arbitration, Security and Disarmament."

International lawyers like to split hairs over the difference between "justiciable" and "non-justiciable" disputes, between "conciliation," "mediation" and "good offices." But "arbitration," as used in this slogan, is an all-inclusive term. It is an abbreviation for the cumbersome phrase: "the various peaceful methods for adjusting conflicts between nations." The first objective of the framers of the Protocol was to render war unnecessary by erecting machinery for settling controversies by other means. Reference was made in the Protocol—and in the Locarno Ac-

cords, which were based on it—to half a dozen different methods of settlement, special *ad hoc* conferences, boards of conciliation, the Arbitration Tribunal at the Hague, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Council of the League. The effort was not so much to determine in advance how any future dispute should be settled, as to make sure that there should be set up an ample choice of methods.

The second member of the slogan—"security"—covers two thoughts. The building of court houses does not give assurance that everybody will obey the law. In order to have any sense of security in international affairs—"security" of the kind which will bring about a decreasing interest in armaments—it is necessary to know two things. One: Who is the disturber of the peace? Two: What are the peace-loving nations going to do about it?

First: How to determine who is responsible for disturbing the peace. In working at this problem, the aid of an American committee—headed by Dr. Shotwell of Columbia—was decisive. The nation which goes to war without having exhausted every possibility of peaceful settlement, is guilty of aggression—is outlawed. The idea was not wholly new, but it could not be taken seriously until the first step—creating adequate machinery for the pacific settlement of international disputes—had been taken. Just so far as the nations perfect their boards of conciliation, their tribunals of arbitration, their courts of justice, their technique of conferences, they will have more and more right to condemn as an outlaw the nation which refuses to use them.

We must expect more frequent controversies between the nations, as evolving civilization brings them into closer and more constant contact. If, when the inevitable dispute arises, one nation says: "We believe that our cause is just. We are willing to submit it to the judgment of our peers." And the other nation says: "No, we judge for ourselves. We trust in our might. March!" there is not doubt as to which is the better citizen in the society of nations. So refusal to submit a controversy to arbitration brands a nation as the disturber of the peace. Appeal to arms, before every effort has been made to find some agreed adjustment, is aggression—the nation which is guilty of it is an outlaw.

The second point, under "security," is equally important—mutual aid. Suppose some nation runs amuck, and, violating its pledges, refusing to arbitrate, invades another country. What will the rest of the world do about it? What will be done to aid the victim of the aggression? This is not an unreal fear—a matter of "seeing ghosts." It actually happened, not so very long ago. In 1914, Serbia offered to arbitrate on the points where it could not agree with Austria, but Austria began shooting.

The pledge of mutual aid against the aggressor is what is meant by the word "sanctions." A large part of the Protocol is given up to determining what the peace-loving nations should do on behalf of the victim of aggression. Of course the principal emphasis is put on prevention. There is elaborate machinery for mobilizing the public opinion of the world on the side of peace as soon as any disturbance is threatened.

But if moral suasion fails, arrangements are made for financial and economic assistance to the victim, boycott and blockade of the guilty, and, if worse comes to worst, the use of force against the outlaw.

For when these nations, some of whom have real, some perhaps only imaginary, reasons for fearing attack, get together to discuss security, they are not content merely to call the war-makers hard names. They are prepared to contribute their share to the police work of preserving the peace and they want assurance that others also recognize and accept the same responsibility.

It is our old frontier philosophy. It was not enough to declare that a horse-thief was an "outlaw." People did not give up carrying their six-shooters, until vigilance committees had been organized, until everybody knew that the sheriff could always rally a group of good citizens to go out and "get the outlaw." Roosevelt expressed the same thought in discussing the League to Enforce Peace. "What is needed in international matters," he said, "is to create a judge and then put police power back of the judge." Behind the sheriff there must be a *posse comitatus*.

The men who drafted the Proctocol were not worried about the absolute, or the ultimate. They were trying to arrange for the kind of arbitration and security which would bring about disarmament in our times. Future generations could be trusted to perfect the details, they were trying to render the menace of war so remote that the burden of armaments could be reduced *now*.

The object of this Protocol, its point of departure

as well as its aim, was the reduction of armaments. The problems of security and the various pacific methods of settling international disputes—substitutes for the arbitrament of war—were studied as a means to this end. It was an endeavor not to "codify international law," but to create it. It was an effort to clarify and define the obligation not to resort to war, which all the members of the League had accepted in the Covenant. It was an attempt to write into the International Statute Book laws which would make war illegal. This is what would have been achieved if the Protocol had been generally ratified.

At this point a digression is necessary as there is evidence of much confusion of thought in Washington on this point. The early stages of the Briand-Kellogg correspondence on the Outlawry of War indicate a cross-word, not a cross-purpose misunderstanding. Senator Borah, for instance, writing in the *New York Times Magazine,* is completely bewildered by what seems to him a paradox. France and the other members of the League have signed a Covenant which begins by accepting obligations not to resort to war and then goes on to discuss situations in which they may have to break off the friendly relations of commerce and to threaten, perhaps actually to use force. He discusses the possibility of a "League War" and says that he can see no conflict between his (Kellogg's) proposal of a multilateral treaty to renounce war and the obligations of the Covenant, unless—as he darkly suspects—the League is an institution to "organize war."

Plainly his difficulty—as the apparent difficulty in

the Briand-Kellogg correspondence—hangs on the question: "What do you mean by war?"

Is the use of force between individuals always lawless? Is the resort to force between nations always war? There is a difference in the use of the revolver in the hands of a highwayman and in the hands of a policeman. Both are regrettable, but there is a difference and there is a similar distinction in the affairs of nations.

When Mr. Hughes argued at Havana that "intervention" is not a "war," he was not straining the usage of these terms as they are accepted in international law. Unless our Government wishes to repudiate Mr. Hughes, unless it wishes to condemn itself for the presence of our armed forces in China and Haiti, it does not include intervention, when it talks of renouncing war.

The members of the League on the whole prefer to use the word "sanctions," where it has been the tradition to employ "intervention." The two ideas are not quite the same. "Sanctions" implies international action, due process of law, joint responsibility; while "intervention" is an act of individual sovereignty. It is the act of a strong nation against a weak one, determined upon by the strong one in the exercise of its own judgment and on its own responsibility, but always justified to the world as police work.

The League of Nations had this matter forced on its attention with considerable emphasis when some Italian officers were brutally murdered on the Greek frontier and the Italian Navy bombarded Corfu. Mussolini insisted that it was not "an act of war,"

but merely "intervention" of the same kind as the American bombardment of Vera Cruz.

Opinion among the members of the League tends to question the wisdom of any one nation taking upon itself the sole responsibility of determining whether intervention is expedient. The theory is gaining ground that, when circumstances arise whereby, under the traditions of international law which Mr. Hughes defended at Havana, intervention is allowable, it is wiser to bring the controversy before some international tribunal and that if sanctions are ultimately necessary, they will be more effective, less likely to go wrong, if they are international.

Of all the great powers, Italy is the only one which would surely support, without qualification, our doctrine of intervention. Soviet Russia would probably uphold the right of intervention, if it were in defense of the Social Revolution. Great Britain would not dispute our theory. It is the justification of the presence of her forces in China. But her efforts to persuade Tokyo and Washington to join forces with her in China, indicate that she would feel the ground somewhat safer, if there were joint responsibility.

With these exceptions most of the other countries are prepared to go further than we in renouncing the use of force in single-handed intervention. On the other hand, they want to go farther than Washington is prepared to go in organizing "sanctions."

So it is evident that, in the Briand-Kellogg negotiation, both sides want to define war in such a way that not all uses of armed forces will be renounced. We wish to except our right to intervene whenever

we think the circumstances justify it. France wants to make exception of her right to join in an organized international intervention. There is real difficulty in bringing these two viewpoints into accord, but it does not seem insuperable.

However, to return to the main theme. The discussion of the Protocol might be summed up from another angle as an honest attempt "to define the Price of Peace." The Protocol brought peace down from the clouds and put it on the market. It is offered for sale. The price is plainly marked. If all the nations agree:

(1) to renounce war and arbitrate any dispute;
(2) to brand as an outlaw any nation which, refusing to arbitrate, begins to fight;
(3) to pool their resources—moral, economic, military—to restrain the outlaw;

the risks of another war in our generation would be too small to figure on any insurance tables. If we want peace, we can get it at that price.

But the price is high. There is no gain in glossing over this disagreeable point. It is better to be pleasantly surprised by finding that what we want to buy costs less than we expected, than to discover that the thing we thought cheap overtaxes our resources. Inevitably the discussion of disarmament brings us back to the same considerations which we discussed in the last chapter. Do we want peace? Do we value peace enough to pay anything like the price at which it is quoted?

The real significance of the Geneva Protocol was that it made the governments of the world face these

questions. There was a great gain in precision of thought. The question before the world today is not: "Do the nations want peace?" but: "Are they willing to pay the price?"

As soon as the Protocol was published it gave rise to intense discussion and it soon became evident—as was not at all surprising—that, while some nations were willing to pay the price, others thought it was excessive. No one argued that peace could not be attained in this way. The opposition came from countries that thought the price was too high.

During a meeting of the Conference on the private trade in arms, a delegate from one of the Scandinavian countries, impatient at the slow progress that was being made, got up and delivered an oration. The nations, he said, which had munition industries, seemed to be overanxious to protect a profitable trade. The nations without such industry seemed to be too anxious to make sure that they could buy more arms than their neighbors. He was all for taking the bull by the horns, for beating swords into ploughshares, for taking the profits out of the munition business. He was an old gentleman, who had grown grey in the Pacifist Crusade, desperately in earnest, sincere in his Christian faith. It was as good a speech as could be put together on these texts, the arguments carefully arranged and it was presented with real eloquence—the eloquence of deep conviction.

When he had finished a delegate from the opposite corner of Europe, from the Balkans, arose: "I ask you, my honorable colleague, to accept my congratulations on your eloquent speech. I beg you to believe

in my sincerity when I say that your every word found a sympathetic echo in my heart. Nothing would make me more happy than if I could rise here in this meeting and, on behalf of my Government, make exactly the same speech. But don't forget that you live in the safe corner of Europe."

There are areas of calm and storm centers on the political map, such as there are on a weather map. Inevitably the words "war" and "peace" conjure up different pictures to people who live in disturbed areas, in the Balkans, for instance, where, ever since paleolithic men broke each other's skulls with stones, migrating races have met and fought, inevitably these words have a meaning in such places quite different from what they have in the safe quiet of America. It is only natural that those who have suffered most from war should be willing to pay most for peace. It is equally natural that those who have been blessed with immunity from invasion—who have only read about the horrors of war—should be less ready to pay a high price for peace—that they should look about for a smaller quantity or a poorer quality of peace at a lesser price.

Also it is evident that the price would fall more heavily on some than on others. It is easy for a remote and relatively weak state to agree enthusiastically that in case of trouble the great powers should act as policemen. Only twice since the League has been founded has there been serious talk of applying the "sanctions" of the Covenant, first in the Corfu Crisis and again in the Greco-Bulgarian case. No one who was present at those discussions could help

noticing the difference in attitude of the representatives of those nations at a safe distance from the danger point and of the governments who—if conciliation failed—would be called upon to act. As a general proposition those nations which have no fleets feel that a naval blockade is much simpler than the governments whose navies would have to do the job. It would be easier to get Finland or Lithuania to agree to an economic blockade of Greece than to persuade those countries that do business with Greece to break off trade relations.

The British Empire—although other governments also balked at the price—took the initiative and the onus of refusing to ratify the Protocol. Sir Austen Chamberlain stated the position of the Conservative Baldwin Cabinet before the Council of the League at its March session in 1925. The core of his argument was that the British Empire could not enter into the proposed engagements because of the absence of the United States and uncertainty as to our attitude. If the Protocol were in force and a war broke out, some nation would be declared the aggressor and it would be the duty of all the others to boycott and blockade the outlaw. If, in such a case, America should insist on its traditional interpretation of neutrality and attempt to trade with both sides, Great Britain, on whom the burden of the naval blockade would fall, would be faced by a controversy with us that she did not care to risk.

To many observers it seemed that, Great Britain having rejected the Protocol, the work done on it had been wasted. But the idea soon came to life again in

the negotiations for a Rhine Security Pact, which led to the Accords of Locarno. In these negotiations there was no consideration of the larger problem of universal peace, it was an attempt to get a smaller quantity of peace—peace in a limited area. How to reduce to a minimum the risk of war in the blood-soaked valley of the Rhine? The long diplomatic negotiations between London, Berlin, and Paris came back inevitably to the ideas, and even to the phraseology, of the Protocol.

The success of the Locarno Conference was tremendous. The relaxation of nerves, the enhanced sense of stability, the new flow of confidence in industry cannot be ignored. Everybody in Europe feels the effect. Even the cautious "White House Spokesman" came out with a surprisingly enthusiastic endorsement. The menace of a war in the Rhineland, which in the days of the Ruhr Occupation was acute, has become too vague to keep anyone awake at night.

Recent discussions at the League show that this other view of disarmament, as expressed in the Protocol, is very much alive. Locarno revitalized it. It works so well in a limited area, that there is a steadily growing demand to have the system generalized.

Mr. Kellogg, speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations in March, 1928, said that he had little hope in these Security Pacts. Here we have the sharpest possible contrast between the two views as to the best way to attack the problem. Mr. Kellogg says that we can assume no responsibility for peace, enter into no engagement to restrain the trouble-maker, accept no definition of "aggressive" war. The

other view is that peace can be established and the reduction of armaments achieved only by building up the network of obligations between the nations, by bringing an ever larger area of international relations in the realm of law and by joint responsibility for maintaining the law.

Turning now from consideration of the other view of disarmament, of what other nations are doing, let us review the actions of our own Government in this matter. We came into the picture of great armaments in August, 1916, when Congress voted our first giant naval appropriation. Of course things like that do not happen suddenly—out of the blue. There was much history behind it. The General Board of the Navy had long been dreaming of sea armaments on a European scale. They had planned a naval program which they considered commensurate—not with the dangers that threatened us—but with our wealth. They seem to have set themselves this problem: Suppose we devoted as large a percentage of our wealth to naval construction as the British, the Japanese or the Germans, how big a navy could we have? The only reason why their ambitious project was not realized earlier was that they could produce no menace which would scare the taxpayer—and his representatives in Congress—into authorizing such expenditures.

With the outbreak of war in Europe, things began to happen which could be advertised as menaces. Our import and export trade was at once disorganized. The British Admiralty exploited its control of the surface of the waves to the limit, trying energet-

ically, if not entirely successfully, to fulfill its promise to the British people to defeat the Germans without having to fight on land. The Germans even more desperately used to the utmost their superiority under the waves. Both sides developed a bizarre doctrine of reprisals, which amounted to punishing unarmed neutrals for the sins of their all-too-heavily-armed enemies. What we had considered to be our established and unquestioned rights as neutrals were invaded with blithe vigor by all the belligerents.

Those who had always advocated a big navy had a wonderful opportunity—of which they made the most—to say, "I told you so." The idea of "preparedness" gained ground. We were told that all the inconveniences which the War caused us were just punishment for not having given the admirals the money they had asked for. All our troubles came from the fact that we were unarmed. If we remained in this unprotected condition, we should be dragged into the War. The only way to avoid this danger was to build warships. At last, reluctantly—irritated beyond bearing by the stupid provocations of both groups of belligerents—President Wilson approved the Navy's plans and Congress said to the General Board, "Go as far as you like." However, appropriations for what the admirals called a "navy equal to the most powerful maintained by any nation in the world," did not stop the provocations. The British Government did not revoke any of their obnoxious Orders in Council and it was not until after this navy bill had become law that the Germans really opened up with their submarine war.

There was an even greater disappointment in store for those who had hoped that letting the General Board have its way would save us from the necessity of fighting. No sooner had we entered the war against Germany, than the Admirals had to admit that the kind of navy they had planned would not do for a real war like this. Their elaborate scheme had to be laid on the shelf—forgotten—while we strained all our ship-building capacity to the limit, building boats that could fight.

Napoleón is reported to have said that professors of strategy in war colleges always teach the lessons of the war before last. I can think of no other explanation for the fact that this 1916 program, which had been set aside as unadapted for real war, while we were at war, was revived as soon as the Armistice was signed. "Peace," as the Irish poet A. E. once remarked, "set in with unusual severity."

The new administration of President Harding found itself committed to this program of very heavy naval expenditure. As is always the case, such a program causes uneasiness in other countries. If the British built no more warships, we in a few years would be superior to them in some categories—notably battleships. But few believed that the British would sit by without a struggle and watch us outbuild them. The Japanese "8-8 Program"—adopted in July, 1920—was more intense than ours and, if they were able to bear the financial strain to completion, it would be necessary for us to increase our expenditures. The building competition was on full blast. We were probably rich enough to keep the pace

longer than our rivals—but a great deal more than the appropriations was involved. We did not like the Anglo-Japanese alliance and obviously the one way to make it a real menace was to give the two countries reason to fear our naval expansion.

Under these circumstances the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments and Far Eastern Questions convened. It stands out as the only conference in which nations have voluntarily agreed to a reduction of their armaments. The battleship tonnage of the three principal navies was greatly reduced. Beyond question it was the most striking achievement in the history of disarmament.

Unfortunately, the real and tangible gains resulting from this Conference, have been obscured by over-claims. Our people were led to believe—or at least were allowed by politicians who knew better, to believe—that the British had agreed to our interpretation of naval equality. This claim was not justified by anything in the treaties nor in the published Minutes of the Conference. The fact that we now learn that there was no agreement about equality would not startle us so much, if Mr. Hughes had not allowed his too zealous admirers to claim too much.

However, the fact that this Conference was not quite so decisive in finally settling all controversy with the British on naval matters, as we were led to hope, should not blind us to its very real accomplishments. It resulted in a definite, concrete and sweeping reduction of battleship tonnage. Of even greater importance was the improvement of our relations with Japan. The Conference accomplished a great deal

towards making the Pacific Ocean deserve its attractive name.

This improvement in our relations with Great Britain and Japan, and the reduction of battleship tonnage, were rendered possible by the fact that Mr. Hughes planned his Conference on the basis of what I have called "the other view" of disarmament. A large part of the time of the delegates went to the discussion of purely political questions about the Far East. The great achievement of the Conference—the thing which had the most sweeping effect on the naval strategy of the Pacific—was the termination, without hard feeling, of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the substitution of the Four-Power Pacific Pact. This Treaty, in which the parties denied any intent of aggression against the insular possessions of the others, and agreed in case their possessions were threatened by the aggressive act of any non-signatory power, to consult together on the preservation of peace in the Pacific, while not going so far as the various security pacts which have been negotiated under the auspices of the League, is of the same substance and was drawn up for the same purpose—to facilitate the reduction of armaments by decreasing the menace of war.

No other effort which has been made to reduce armaments on the basis of this "other view" has had anything like the success of the Washington Conference and so it is the best illustration of how the theory can be applied in practice. Under this "other view" armaments are considered not as the disease, but as the clinical thermometer which registers the

progress of the cure. You cannot reduce a fever by trying to push down the column of mercury in the thermometer. But if treatment reduces the fever, the column of mercury will fall and so make visible the progress of the cure. The Washington Conference notably lessened the political tension in the Pacific—reduced the fever—and the battleships that went to the scrap heap were not the cause but the visible record of the improved condition.

After the encouraging success of the Washington Conference, our Government rested on its oars. From time to time delegates were sent to Geneva to participate in the discussion of the private trade in arms or the preparation for a General Disarmament Conference, but it was not until February 10th, 1927, when President Coolidge sent his message to Congress, suggesting a new naval conference at Geneva, that our Government bid once more for leadership in this campaign for the reduction of armaments.

The circumstances, of course, were very different from what they had been on the eve of the Washington Conference. In 1927 we were not engaged in a program of naval building which threatened the other naval powers and so held no such trumps as we had held in 1921. Also, it appears that the policy of the Administration had changed considerably. Instead of following Mr. Hughes' successful method and treating the problem of armaments as an aspect of the complex political situation, the Coolidge plan isolated a limited phase of the naval balance and proposed to treat it as a purely technical problem. Instead of treating the disease, we tried to manipu-

late the mercury in the thermometer. The cart was put before the horse. Unless there is some understanding of the purposes for which navies are to be used—a matter of politics—there can be no comparison. There is no technical standard by which anyone can determine whether Pandemonia should have a larger or smaller number of war canoes than Infernia.

Not only in the terms of the invitation, but even more emphatically in the personnel of the American Delegation, President Coolidge marked an attitude quite different from that of 1921. At the Washington Conference, the American Delegation consisted of Mr. Hughes, the Secretary of State; Senators Lodge and Underwood, the ranking Republican and Democratic members of the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs; and the doyen of American statesmen, Mr. Root. They had plenty of technical advisers, but the composition of the Delegation emphasized the political importance of the work entrusted to them. The Delegation to the Coolidge Conference reversed the emphasis. The civilian side was represented by our junior ambassador, the naval side by our senior admiral.

Due to these circumstances, which were of our own choosing, there seemed little prospect to those who regard the problem of disarmament from the other view that the Conference could succeed. What small chance there was of success was torpedoed by the first speech of Mr. Bridgeman, the Chief of the British Delegation. It was not so much that he proposed building more warships than we liked, nor that he

disagreed with our naval men on "tonnage" and "guns." Such differences, if there is a basis for agreement, can be reduced by negotiations and mutual concessions. The basic theory of his memorandum was inadmissable in any conference called for the purpose of securing agreement on the limitation of arms. He assumed that there was no way of protecting British maritime interests except by the British Navy and he told the world that, while his Government had no aggressive designs, they had figured out that they needed *x* number of cruisers to protect their bread lines in the seven seas. At a later session, Admiral Jellicoe stated the same thesis a little more crudely.

If a nation decides to go it alone, desires no cooperation from others, suspects all nations of hostility and is prepared to ignore what others think of its actions, this is a tenable theory. It was the theory of the Pharaoh. It was the theory of the British in their days of "Splendid Isolation." But in those days, they did not waste their own time, or the time of others in discussing agreement on the limitation of armaments. Years ago, the British found that they could not swing things on this theory. Such isolation worked out as something altogether too expensive or far from splendid. They abandoned the idea when they went into an alliance with Japan and turned over the defense of some of their interests in the Far East to their ally. The Admiralty had to go one step further in admitting that it could not carry the load single-handed and the diplomats of the Foreign Office were asked to work out an understanding with France, so that, trusting their new friend to protect their inter-

ests in the Mediterranean, the Admiralty could concentrate its forces in the North Sea.

When Mr. Bridgeman, speaking for the British Government, repudiated this policy of co-operation and revived the theory of single-handed defense, it was obvious that the Conference was on the rocks.

"Needs of National Defense"—even if it were possible to discover a meaning for the phrase—is impossible as a basis of international accord on the limitation of armaments. Of course, the British Admiralty has a perfect right to meet privately in their chambers in Whitehall and decide how many cruisers they need to defend their long lanes of sea communications, as Mr. Bridgeman said they did—if they think they can get away with it. But they are strangely naïve if they think the rest of the world will accept their decision without question. If the British are to have a navy which is capable of defending their merchant ships in all the seven seas, it must be capable of driving every other merchant ship off the seas. It will be a menace not only to us, but to all the seafarers of the world. There is no hope of voluntary agreement on this basis.

Of course the rule works both ways. If we need a navy adequate to "defend" our interests in the Caribbean Sea—against all comers—it must be strong enough to seize the Dutch, French and British West Indies. The General Board of the Navy is so jealous of the British that it cannot help imitating them and has now taken over Mr. Bridgeman's argument and says we must base our building program on the need of defending our overseas commerce. An

American Navy which could successfully defend our mercantile marine in the Pacific would also be capable of bombarding Sidney and Batavia, Hong Kong and Yokohama. The rest of the world will never admit that either we or the British, in order to feel safe ourselves, must hold a pistol in their face.

In somewhat similar circumstances, during a discussion of land armaments at Geneva, Herr Stresemann told an old story that comes down from the days of the Roman Republic, but which is very fresh today. A citizen appeared in the Forum, where it was forbidden to carry arms, armed to the teeth. He was asked why he so obviously violated the custom and he replied that he was afraid that he might be attacked. "But," said the elders, "who gave you the right to be so afraid?"

It matters not at all whether it is the British or the French, the Germans or ourselves, a country which trusts no one, which fears everyone, which feels that it cannot be safe unless it is prepared to fight all the world combined—whatever its other virtues may be—has no place in a Conference which is seeking agreement on the limitation of armaments. If safety at sea, if protection of maritime interests, can be assured only by the ability to blow everybody else out of the water, there is not much hope for naval reductions.

Attention has often been called to the fact that it is harder to see a difficulty than to solve it. It is quite impossible to solve a problem unless you know what it is. It is rare that people or nations come to blows over controversies which they frankly discuss. Seri-

ous trouble more often arises over difficulties which are not discussed and not clearly stated. At this unfortunate Coolidge Conference the real issue was never discussed at all.

Warships have two functions; occasionally they do battle with enemy warships, most of the time they are operating against unarmed merchant ships, trying to stop commerce from which the enemy might profit. It would be interesting to know what percentage of the ships which flew the British Royal Navy Ensign during the last war ever sighted an enemy warship—not many of them. I do not believe—Admiral Plunkett to the contrary—that the British Admiralty or our General Board is seriously thinking of Anglo-American naval battles. It was this second, less advertised, function of warships—commerce raiding—which was not discussed at Geneva, that was the real bone of contention. All the wrangle about "equality" was shadow boxing.

"Equality" is a meaningless phrase. Suppose there was agreement between Washington and London to scrap all their warships, except two sister ships, exactly alike in every particular—one for each country. Even in such absurdly simplified conditions there would be no real equality, unless there were a supplementary agreement that the two ships would never fight except in the exact middle of the ocean. Any kind of a warship, from battle cruiser to torpedo boat, loses power in direct ratio to its distance from its base. If the United States and Great Britain had only one warship apiece and they were twins, the British Navy would be supreme in its waters and the

American Navy would rule the waves on our side of the Atlantic. Perhaps it was the obvious silliness of the word that made them change it at Geneva and talk about "parity" instead.

I returned to Geneva for a few days, during this Coolidge Conference, and noticed this change in terms and wondered if it had a hidden and mysterious meaning. I made myself unpopular with some of my friends in both the British and the American Delegations by asking them whether "parity" was more or less than "equality." I could get no answer.

Of course neither the Admiralty in London nor the General Board of the Navy in Washington have any use for the idea of equality. Each body, as is its manifest duty, thinks of its own special situation, the peculiar problems it has to worry about, the kinds of warfare it is likely to have to face, the localities and circumstances in which it may have to fight and, as patriotic citizens, wants to be fit and prepared to win. Neither the British Admirals nor our own can—it is an affront to their honesty to suggest that they should —betray the traditions in which they have been bred, the training which we have prepared for them. I have no patience with any who would suggest that Army or Navy men should have any other ideal than to win, than to use the money we put at their disposal to secure the equipment which will give them not equality with possible enemies, but such a margin of superiority as will assure victory. God knows that if they do have to fight, we hope they will win. It is not their business to organize peace, it is up to them to

prepare to win, if the rest of us fail to organize peace.

It is not their business to codify the laws of sea fighting. It is up to them to put up a good fight, if their government gives them the order, to fight as hard and successfully as they can, according to the rules which their government tells them are the laws of naval warfare. The question which they did not discuss at Geneva, a question that the admirals are not competent to discuss—the question which has been at the base of all our controversies with the English in naval matters, ever since the War of 1812—is this very matter of the laws of naval warfare. What are the respective rights of belligerents and neutrals on the seas? That is not a question to be determined by admirals, it is their duty to accept the law as it is given them by their governments.

If this whole question is not threshed out and settled by statesmen, if no agreement is reached to the contrary, we must expect in any next war the same uncertainty, confusion and hard feeling that arose in the last one. If the British are belligerent in some future war and we remain neutral, the Admiralty will want to carry on as they did in the last war and for that they need a flock of small fast cruisers to cut up commerce all over the map. If, in these circumstances, we want to force the British to respect what we consider our rights, we have no need at all for such little commerce raiders, we want our cruisers just as big, just as near in size and armament to battleships, as the Washington Treaty allows, so that they can be used with our battle fleet to demonstrate

in English waters and wigwag an impressive message: "If you're not good—if you don't leave our merchantmen alone—we'll join your enemy."

The missions which are to be entrusted to warships will be determined not by "technical" but by "political" considerations. Such questions—at bottom the only interesting ones—were carefully excluded from the agenda of this Conference. Neither side dared to say why they preferred a particular type of cruiser and time was wasted, tempers ruined in the vain attempt to find "technical" sanctification for "political" designs.

A more dismal failure than this Coolidge Conference could hardly be imagined. The doctors became so heated ordering the column of mercury in the thermometer to go down, quarreling with each other because it did not obey, that the patient's fever rose rapidly. Called for the purpose of reducing the burden and danger of naval armaments and of improving the relations between the nations, the Conference resulted in bringing before Congress the most startling building program it has ever had to consider. It has created more hard feeling in the English-speaking world than anything which has happened in our memory.

Something may be accomplished by what Mr. James calls the American view of disarmament, by trying to snatch the club away from Cain. In spite of the abject failure of last summer, something may yet be accomplished by the methods of the Coolidge Conference. Our rapidly growing power is a tremendous argument. Other countries will listen seri-

ously to our proposals, although they do not understand our motives nor approve our tactics—although they think there is more hope of success if the problem is attacked from the other viewpoint.

But even if our Government does not accept this other view of disarmament, even if we are unwilling to join in any security experiment like the Protocol—even if we think that the price others are prepared to pay for peace is excessive—it is hard to find any reasons to justify us in blocking their efforts. And uncertainty about how we would act in case the other nations united for police action to preserve the peace and restrain the aggressor, *is* blocking their effort. We are so strong that if we join forces with the highwayman, the policemen will run. If we claim the right to be strictly neutral—just as ready to help the crook as the cop—any attempt to establish a reign of law among the nations is paralyzed.

Without even discussing membership in the League of Nations, without adhering to the Permanent Court of International Justice, without signing a single modern arbitration treaty, we could get out of the way of those who want to try out this other view. Without giving up our own ideas of how to reduce armaments, without decreasing whatever chances there may be of success by the methods of the Coolidge Conference, we could give those who are working for the same object by other means a fair chance. A formal declaration of policy along some such lines as these, would, at worst, not hurt us, at best help them.

"The Government of the United States is not pre-

pared to enter into any agreement binding it to take part in any dispute that may in the future arise between the nations. However, although unwilling to engage its responsibility in any effort to outlaw war, although unwilling to take any risks in the interests of peace, it looks with friendly interest on the efforts other nations are making in this direction. Any voluntary compacts between other nations, which, like the Accords of Locarno, have these objects in view, are assured of the sympathy of the United States.

"If any nation, having freely entered into a covenant to renounce war, shall be adjudged to have violated its pledge by a tribunal which it has joined in establishing, and shall be declared guilty of a war of aggression, according to rule of procedure which it has previously accepted, the Government of the United States will not, under plea of the rights of neutral trade, give it support. America will not be the accomplice of a nation that, by breaking its covenant, brings itself into contempt of its own court and so draws down upon itself the ban of outlawry."

Such a declaration of policy could not be construed as an "entangling alliance." It would neither commit us to arbitration in our own quarrels nor make us the judge in the disputes of others. It would not pledge us to make war in future and unforeseeable circumstances, nor would it deprive Congress of its treasured right to declare war whenever it wants to. It would not express an opinion as to the wisdom or workability of any machinery other nations might see fit to set up for "the pacific settlement of international disputes," nor would it be advising other na-

tions to enter into such security pacts. It would be merely a statement to the world that, if other nations saw fit to subscribe freely and publicly to such agreements, we would take them seriously, that we would think they meant what they said. It would be a warning to other nations that they could not rely on us to help them out if they got themselves into trouble by violating their own pledges.

Why should we permit any uncertainty in this matter? If other nations are so desirous to outlaw war that they are willing to accept such obligations and responsibilities—even if we think that the price they are willing to pay for peace is more than we care to put up—why should we thwart them?

Is it because our munitioneers want to profit by trade with both the policeman and the highwayman? Or is it because we are ashamed to see it demonstrated that others are willing to do more and risk more for peace than we?

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